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A CRITIQUE OF LAW AND APOLOGIES
YONATHAN A. ARBEL & YOTAM KAPLAN*
In this Article, we show how the biggest tort reform of the last decade
was passed through the back door with the blessing of its staunchest
opponents. We argue that the widely-endorsed "apology law" reform-a
change in the national legal landscape that privileged apologies-is, in fact,
a mechanism of tort reform, used to limit victims' recovery and shield
injurers from liability. While legal scholars overlooked this effect,
commercial interests eized the opportunity and are in the process of
transforming state and federal law with the unwitting support of the public.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do large commercial interests-insurance companies,
manufacturers, hospitals-pledge millions of dollars to lobby for laws that
encourage apologies? What may explain this very recent interest of
commercial firms in the virtue of apologies? Why did tort reformers come to
adopt the rhetoric of regret, consilience, and penance? And how did the
largest tort reform of the last few decades pass with the blessing of its
staunchest opponents?
Tort reform is a highly contentious social agenda. It is based on a belief
that litigation is inherently biased in favor of plaintiffs and must, therefore,
be reined in by measures such as damages caps and screening panels.1
Opponents of tort reform dispute this basic premise; they worry that
limitations on liability would unduly deprive accident victims of much-
needed compensation and would encourage negligent and reckless behavior.
The political pendulum slowly swings between these two positions.
In recent years, tort reformers have found a new and powerful platform
to advance their position, one that allowed them to strike a major victory in
their war against what they perceive as excessive liability: apology laws,
laws designed to privilege apologies made by injurers, making them
inadmissible at trial. By co-opting the rhetoric and discourse on apologies
and the law-independently developed by ethicists, dispute resolution
1. See infra Part L.B.
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specialists, and legal theorists-they found a path into the hearts of
legislators and the public. This maneuver has been so effective that even
long-standing opponents of tort reform, such as former President Barack
Obama, expressed support for these reforms.2 In only two decades, thirty-six
states have adopted apology laws, and there is currently a strong push to
expand apology law reform to the federal level and to other areas of law. 3
This Article argues and demonstrates that despite appearances, apology
laws are de-facto tort reform. Looking beyond the virtuous rhetoric, the
effect of apology laws on commercial actors is similar to that of damages
caps.4 In other words, we make the overlooked claim that apology laws
undercut the deterrent effect of tort liability.5 We base our argument on tort
theory as well as research in psychology, economics, sociology, and
marketing. We contend that apology laws facilitate and encourage strategic
apologies by commercial actors-apologies that do not express a real
commitment to avoid future wrongdoing. Instead, commercial apologies
exploit the human tendency to forgive, a tendency with myriad
psychological, social, and evolutionary reasons. For any of these reasons,
victims forgive and settle for a fraction of the value of their claims, foregoing
hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensation. Because commercial
actors can anticipate in advance that they will be exposed to limited liability
if they apologize, they will have less of an incentive to invest in precautions
that would prevent accidents in the first place. In other words, apologies
dilute deterrence, making it better to be sorry than safe. This problem is
exacerbated in light of new market trends that "professionalize" and facilitate
the tender of apologies by commercial actors, thus greatly amplifying their
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. See, e.g., Chandler Farmer, Striking a Balance: A Proposed Amendment o the Federal Rules
of Evidence Excluding Partial Apologies, 2 BELMONT L. REv. 243, 264 (2015) (calling for the creation
of federal apology laws); Lauren Gailey, "I'm Sorry" as Evidence? Why the Federal Rules of Evidence
Should Include a New Specialized Relevance Rule to Protect Physicians, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 172, 180
(2015); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposalfor Reform of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 367 (1999) (calling for the use of shaming and
apologies as a substitute to criminal sanctions); Michael B. Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating
Federal Protection for the Full Apology in Civil Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 137, 148-49 (2009). See
also infra note 76.
4. Indeed, to the economist, apologies are puzzling: "they must be regarded as cheap talk," and
"the only thing that is relevant is the expected magnitude of penalties." Murat C. Mungan, Don't Say
You're Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing Apologies to Achieve Credibility, 32 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
178, 178 (2012). Mungan argues that wrongdoers benefit from apologizing, as it relieves their guilt, which
suggests that a special penalty will be levied on those who apologize. Id. at 179. See also Murat C.
Mungan, A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal Law Enforcement, 6 REV. L. &
ECON. 97, 98 (2010) (noting that certain individuals feel a relief of their guilt after being punished). Our
focus on commercial apologies suggests a lesser role for relief of guilt than in Mungan's analysis.
5. See infra Part II.A.
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potential harmful effects.6
The policy implications of our argument span three domains. First, the
argument highlights a democratic gap in apology laws, inviting greater, and
more informed, public scrutiny of the discussion over these laws, either in
the context of pending attempts to expand these laws or in the context of
repealing them. The public should start viewing apology laws as
homomorphous with tort reform. Second, our argument suggests that
consumer and patient safety may be in jeopardy due to the use of apologies,
and we believe scholars hould suspend their support of these laws and focus
on establishing their actual effect on patient safety. Finally, judges should be
made aware of the side effects of apologies and learn to approach them with
greater caution in commercial settings.
Our argument explains, among other things, why we are suddenly
witnessing deep interest from commercial actors and tort reformers in the
virtues of apologies in the context of private law.7 These reformers realized
that by using the uncontroversial rhetoric of apologies and penance they can
mobilize legislators from both sides of the political aisle. Hence, the support
of apology laws by commercial interests should not be viewed as a
commendable fusion of social and moral norms with business practices, but
rather as a self-interested decision with potentially harmful social effects.
To provide a sense of the magnitude of the effect commercial apologies
have on victims, it is illuminating to consider the results of studies done on
payments to victims in states that enacted apology laws.8 These studies,
concentrating on hospitals, show a reduction of as much as 60% in payments
to victims. This translates to a reduction of $32,000-$73,000 in legal payouts
per case,9 which, for many victims, marks the difference between being able
6. Our analysis does not assume that all commercial apologies are merely strategic. See infra Part
II.A.2.
7. We do not address in this paper the topics of public or state apologies, which raise distinct
issues. For more on these issues, see generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Michael R. Marrus,
Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 75 (2007).
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, What's an Apology Worth? Decomposing the Effect of
Apologies on Medical Malpractice Payments Using State Apology Laws, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
179, 192 (2011) (showing a reduction of $32,665 per case); Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry
Work? The Impact ofApology Laws on Medical Malpractice, 43 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 143, 161
(2011) [hereinafter Ho & Liu, Does Sorry Work?] (showing a reduction of $58,000-$73,000 for severe
cases and $16,989-$24,017 for less severe cases, but -$3,132-$431 for insignificant cases, suggesting a
potential increase in payouts for those cases). See also Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn
& W. Kip Viscusi, Sorry Is Never Enough: The Effect of State Apology Laws on Medical Malpractice
Liability Risk (Dec. 10, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
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to afford proper treatment for their accidents and suffering from disability
and abject poverty. For firms, on the other hand, the costs of apologies are
relatively marginal, and there is a large consensus that apologies are cost-
saving devices which can cut down operational costs by millions of dollars
in regulatory fines, judgments, and public outrage.'0
The Article has three Parts. In Part I, we explore the unexpected
camaraderie between ethicists and tort reformers. We show how the legal
apology movement was co-opted by the tort reform lobby to successfully
effect tort reform across the nation. Part II grounds apologies in tort theory
and explains how apologies can undermine deterrence in commercial
settings. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the problem is most acute if
apologies are cheap to produce and have a strong effect on victims. We then
survey recent developments in commercial apologies that show that
commercial apologies have indeed become cheaper and are highly effective.
Part III examines the theoretical and policy implications of these
developments. We argue that the evidence in support of apology law reform
is weak, and while much empirical evidence is still needed, the existing
evidence is consistent with the concern that apology laws undermine
liability. After a brief conclusion, an Appendix details our analysis using a
formal economic model.
I. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: OF ETHICISTS AND TORT
REFORMERS
In recent decades, legal scholars from distinct disciplines-ethicists,
dispute resolution experts, and sociologists-have formed a movement that
challenged the traditional approach of the law of apologies. This Part tracks
the rise of this movement and its internal discourse. It then shows how the
rhetoric developed by this movement was co-opted by commercial interests
lobbying for apology laws in state legislatures. These attempts were
immensely successful, and this Part concludes by documenting the change
in the legal landscape.
A. APOLOGIES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
In the early 1990s, a movement of loosely formed "Legal Apologists"
started to gain traction.'' The Legal Apologists critiqued the resolution of
abstractid=2883693 (reaching findings similar to those offered by Ho and Liu).
10. See, e.g., Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Organizational Apologies: BP as a Case Study, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 1957, 1977-79 (2011) (discussing the role and effect of corporate apologies).
11. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1019-23
(1999) (explaining the benefits of apologies to clients); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted:
2017] 1203
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conflict by the legal system for being overly abrasive to the relationship of
the parties. Instead, they argued that apologies can provide an effective and
wholesome solution to disputes. Despite the perception that apologies are
private and informal acts operating outside of the law, they argued that the
law has an important facilitative role.12 In their view, the law should
encourage individuals to apologize or, at the very least, not stand in the way
of those who wish to apologize. The Legal Apologists claimed that apologies
have a wide array of benefits. When an individual is wronged, an apology by
the responsible party may acknowledge the harm done to the victim and the
victim's agency,13 reduce feelings of anger and aggression by the victim, 14
control the attribution of fault to the responsible party,'5 and start the process
of healing.16 As a consequence, apologies are said to mend the social fabric
Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L.
REV. 221, 247 (1999) (advocating for legal protection of apologies); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett,
The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
461, 487-88 (1986) (arguing that the incorporation of apologies into the American legal culture would
reduce litigation and repair relationships). Regarding the trend, see Aaron Lazare, The Healing Force of
Apology in Medical Malpractice and Beyond, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 251 (2008) ("Beginning in the
early 1990s, there was a surge of academic and public interest in apologies.").
12. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11, at 1011 ("Although a physician may wish to tell a patient when
he has made a mistake, lawyers often order doctors to say nothing."). See also Farmer, supra note 3, at
249 (calling apologies "legally dangerous").
13. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 107 (2005) (considering acknowledgment of harm as the
foundation of an apology); Michael C. Jones, Can I Say I'm Sorry?: Examining the Potential of an
Apology Privilege in Criminal Law, 7 ARIz. SUMMIT L. REV. 563, 567 (2014) (noting that in restorative
justice, "[t]he offender acknowledges the harm he caused [and] apologizes").
14. See Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, Note & Comment, On Apology and Consilience, 77
WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (2002) ("In the face of a heartfelt apology, victims . . . report feeling a near
instantaneous erosion of anger and pain."); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its
Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 221
(1989) (testing empirically the effects of apologies on victim's aggression and finding soothing effects).
15. Psychologists find that apologies have a paradoxical effect. On the one hand, apologies imply
guilt and responsibility, but on the other hand, experiments consistently find that apologies reduce the
attribution of fault to the wrongdoer and increase the belief that the wrong happened for reasons outside
the wrongdoer's control, See Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children s Reactions to Apologies,
43 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 742, 745, 749 (1982) (finding that children attribute less
responsibility to apologizing transgressors); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness,
59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 308 (1991) ("confession[s] alter perceptions of the confessor's moral character
and causal attributions for the negative action."). On the paradox, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies
and Reasonableness: Some Implications ofPsychology for Torts, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 492 (2010).
16. See LAZARE, supra note 13, at 263 (listing the healing properties of apologies); Margareth
Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQUETTE L. REV. 295, 297
(2007) (arguing that victims of crimes find "emotional restoration" and a "re-established sense of
security" when receiving apologies). See also Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating
Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 90 (2004) ("[Apologies] heal
offenders, victims, and communities. Remorse and apology would teach offenders lessons, vindicate
victims, and encourage communities to welcome wrongdoers back into the fold."); Brent T. White, Say
You're Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1273-74
1204
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torn by the transgression,17 restore prior relationships,'8  and facilitate
negotiation.19 Importantly, the apology expresses a reestablished obligation
to refrain from future transgressions.20
For the Legal Apologists, all of these advantages link to one
overarching theme: apologies facilitate effective dispute resolution.21 By
(2006); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role ofApology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1176-77
(1997) (arguing that apologies can be viewed as a form of compensation as they heal part of the harm).
17. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY 13 (1991) ("An apology thus
speaks to an act that cannot be undone but hat cannot go unnoticed without compromising the current
and future relationship of the parties, the legitimacy of the violated rule, and the wider social web in
which the participants are enmeshed.") Tavuchis also argues that apologies serve to reaffirm the victim's
membership in the community. See id. at 7-8, 20-21; Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's
Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 44 BRIT. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 353, 354 (noting that by apologizing, the offender "reaffirms the values of the rules that have
been broken"); Erving Goffman, On Face-Work: An Analysis ofRitual Elements in Social Interaction,
18 PSYCHIATRY 213, 220 (1955) (finding that the apology is intended to "correct for the offense and
reestablish the expressive order"); Roy J. Lewicki et al., An Exploration of the Structure of Effective
Apologies, 9 NEGOT. & CONFLICT MGMT. RES. 173, 176 (2016). See also Samuel P. Oliner, Altruism,
Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation as Public Sociology, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY
375, 380 (Vincent Jeffries ed., 2009) ("Through genuine apology and forgiveness, harmony may be
restored.").
18. See Orenstein, supra note 11, at 241 ("[A]pologies can transform individuals and regenerate
relationships."). According to equity theory, individuals strive for a sense of equity in their relationships,
which is disturbed by wrongdoing. The sense of imbalance is reported to create anxiety. See generally
Brad R.C. Kelln & John H. Ellard, An Equity Theory Analysis of the Impact of Forgiveness and
Retribution on Transgressor Compliance, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 864 (1999). Apologies
are found to restore the sense of equity by demonstrating that the offender suffers too. See Robbennolt,
supra note 15, at 492. See also Kish Vinayagamoorthy, Apologies in the Marketplace, 33 PACE L. REV.
1081, 1105 (2013) (arguing that an apology "reminds the transgressor of the value of the relationship").
19. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1020 ("Indignity can be a large barrier to compromise, and in
many cases, an apology is needed . . . ."); Robin E. Ebert, Attorneys, Tell Your Clients to Say They're
Sorry: Apologies in the Health Care Industry, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 337, 339 (2015) (advocating for
the use of apologies as a settlement strategy); Nancy L. Zisk, A Physician 's Apology: An Argument
Against Statutory Protection, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 369, 390 (2015) ("In light of the powerful
empirical data suggesting that physicians can reduce their chances of being sued by communicating
openly and honestly with their patients... the conclusion seems inescapable that physicians must disclose
mistakes and admit responsibility for those mistakes."). For a general discussion of research in emotion
in negotiations, see Max H. Bazerman et al., Negotiation, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 285-86 (2000).
20. See Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity and Expectancies
About Repeating Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 299 (2000); Runnels, supra
note 3, at 143-44 ("The apologetic offender will therefore be perceived as less likely to engage in similar
offending behavior in the future."); Mihaela Mihai, Apology, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/apology (last visited Sept. 4, 2017) (noting that to be considered valid, the
apology must imply an intention to refrain from similar actions in the future).
21. See Cohen, supra note I1, at 1061 ("[E]ncouraging apologies to occur early on may prevent
many injuries from escalating into legal disputes."); Ebert, supra note 19, at 339 (noting that apologies
can reduce litigation); Farmer, supra note 3, at 244 ("A sincere apology can help promote judicial
economy by unlocking stalled settlement negotiations . . . [and] can help ensure that impasse is avoided
altogether."); Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Does "Sorry" Incriminate? Evidence, Harm and the Protection of
Apology, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 567, 567 (2012) ("Apology has proven a dramatically effective
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defusing victims' desire for vindication,2 2 apologies avoid disputes and
encourage settlements, thus saving protracted legal proceedings with their
emotional and pecuniary costs.23
To demonstrate that these benefits are not merely theoretical, the Legal
Apologists have set to prove them empirically, mostly in lab settings. The
resulting studies have shown that victims of wrongful conduct report a strong
desire to receive an apology, and once this need is met, victims express
satisfaction and high willingness to settle and forego litigation.24 A leading
example is Jennifer Robbennolt's work. In a series of experimental studies,
Robbennolt found that apologies increase victims' belief that they would win
their lawsuits, but paradoxically, she also found that recipients of apologies
had more favorable views of the injurer, were more willing to settle, and
were more receptive to lower settlement offers.25 Robbennolt also found that
means of resolving conflict and preventing litigation."); Orenstein, supra note 11, at 242 ("[Alpologies
can substitute for costly litigation."); Zisk, supra note 19, at 390.
22. See supra note 16.
23. Steven Shavell and Mitchell Polinsky estimate that costs of the legal system absorb almost half
of payments made by plaintiffs to defendants. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case
for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1470 (2010) ("[F]or each dollar that an accident victim
receives in a settlement or judgment, it is reasonable to assume that a dollar of legal and administrative
expenses is incurred.").
24. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients'and Physicians'Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure
of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1001 (2003) (finding that patients expressed a desire to receive
an apology following a medical error); Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File
Medical Malpractice Claims Following Prenatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992) (noting that
24% of patients filed claims "when they realized that physicians had failed to be completely honest with
them about what happened, allowed them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled
them"); Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical
Grievances, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105, 116 (1990) (finding that the absence of doctor concern motivates
patients to bring suit); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and
Relatives Taking LegalAction, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994) (finding that 37% of respondents aid that
they would not have sued had there been a full explanation and an apology and that 14% indicated that
they would not have sued had there been an admission of negligence); Amy B. Witman et al., How Do
Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic
Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2566 (1996) (finding that 98% of respondents "desired or
expected the physician's active acknowledgement of an error," and that "patients were significantly more
likely to either report or sue the physician when he or she failed to acknowledge the mistake"). See also
Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and
Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 433, 442 (1998) (finding a desire for
apologies in a survey of victims of sexual abuse); Piper Fogg, Minnesota System Agrees to Pay $500,000
to Settle Pay-Bias Dispute, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 14, 2003, at Al 2 ("'I want an apology,' [a class-
action plaintiff] said [in disappointed reaction to a settlement], 'and I am never going to get it."');
Editorial, The Paula Jones Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at C6.
25. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
333, 353-56 (2006); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 462 (2003) [hereinafter Robbennolt, Legal Settlement]. See also
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental
1206
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victims who received an apology believed that the injurer is more likely to
be careful in the future.26 Armed with theory and evidence, the Legal
Apologists quickly swept legal academia. As others recently noted: "In the
last two decades, apology legal scholarship has become increasingly
robust."27 In our own analysis, we found hundreds of legal articles on the
issue, starting mostly in the 1990s and peaking in popularity in the 2000s.2 8
The ideas inspired by the movement quickly spread to other areas of
law, with apologies becoming the main item on the agenda for advocates of
"restorative justice,"29 "therapeutic jurisprudence,"o and alternative dispute
resolution, with special emphasis on mediation.31 Apologies were offered as
a means of reforming diverse areas of law, such as criminal law,32 medical
malpractice, tort law,34 and intellectual property.5 It was even suggested
that part of the Federal Register ("probably one of the driest publications
ever printed") should include a section for governmental apologies.36
This account of the literature will not be complete without mentioning
the internal divisions within the Legal Apologists. The most common
objections are that providing legal protection to apologies would negate their
Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 148-50 (1994) (finding, but with low statistical significance, that
apologies affect willingness to settle).
26. See Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 506. For the effect of apologies outside the lab, see infra
Part II.C.
27. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Apologies as Intellectual Property Remedies: Lessons from China, 44
CONN. L. REV. 883, 891 (2012).
28. Data acquired from a Lexis Advance search, using the search terms "title(apolog*) OR
summary(apolog*)" to search all Law Review and journal articles between 1984-2015. A total of 326
results were found.
29. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 103 ("Restorativists consider apology and remorse
important as part of a holistic process."); Alana Saulnier & Diane Sivasubramaniam, Effects of Victim
Presence and Coercion in Restorative Justice: An Experimental Paradigm, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 378,
379 (2015) ("[Alpology is central to restorative justice.").
30. See Jones, supra note 13, at 565-68 (surveying therapeutic justice and apologies in criminal
law). See also Susan Daicoff, Apology, Forgiveness, Reconciliation & Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 13
PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 131, 153-57 (2013) (surveying the field of therapeutic jurisprudence).
31. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 130-35 (advocating for a greater role for mediation
in criminal settings because it encourages apologies and remorse); Angela M. Eastman, The Power of
Apology and Forgiveness, 36 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 55, 55-56 (2014) (discussing the effectiveness of
apologies in dispute resolution); Levi, supra note 16, at 1165.
32. See generally Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16 (calling for a fuller integration of apologies
and expressions of regret into criminal procedure).
33. See Gailey, supra note 3, at 177-78.
34. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman, The Role ofApology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 188-89
(2000).
35. See Nguyen, supra note 27, at 886-87.
36. Eugene R. Fidell, Sorry, 71 Fed Reg. 1 (2006), 8 GREEN BAG 155, 156 (2005).
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moral value,37 that people would fake apologies and courts would be ill-
positioned to verify their authenticity,3 8 or that frequent apologies would lead
victims to accept settlements that do not compensate them fully.39 Despite
these challenges, the movement itself is still going strong, seemingly in the
belief that none of these challenges are insurmountable-which, as we will
argue, is most understandable if the literature is read as focusing on
interpersonal apologies.
B. TORT REFORM
Moving from the high-minded Legal Apologists and their concern with
the nuances of ethics, we consider the seemingly unrelated world of tort
reform. Tort reformers, known mostly for their activism in medical
malpractice and product liability, fight to limit what they see as the excessive
costs imposed on defendants as a result of biased litigation. They argue that
doctors are motivated not only by concern for patients but also by financial
37. See, e.g., TAVUCHIS, supra note 17, at 34 (explaining that the potential for negative
repercussions is an essential part of apologies); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of
Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1142 (2000) (arguing that the morality of apologies derives from the
exposure of the apologizing party to the consequences of the wrongful act). Interestingly, victims may
also abuse apologies by refusing to accept them, in order to use them as a basis for a lawsuit. See O'Hara
& Yarn, supra note 14, at 1176. For a critique stating that apologies are helpful even when they do not
admit blame, see Helmreich, supra note 21, at 609.
38. On strategic apologies, see Ebert, supra note 19, at 364 ("[A] wrongdoer might apologize for
the wrong reasons."); O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 14, at 1186 ("[A]pology can be used as a tool for
organizations to strategically take advantage of individual victims' instincts to forgive in the face of
apology."); Daniel Eisenberg, When Doctors Say, "We're Sorry, " TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 50 (observing
that many believe that "[a]pology laws . . . could just usher in an epidemic of playacting"). In one case,
for example, a defendant who was ordered by the court to apologize published an ad in the newspaper-
later on the same day-saying that he was not really sorry. Amanda Garrett, Apologize or Go to Jail:
Judge Orders Criminals to Say, 'I'm Sorry, 'to Victims, PLAIN DEALER REP., Oct. 9, 1999, at lB. But see
Cohen, supra note 11, at 1065-66 (assuaging the concern that lawyers will advise clients to strategically
apologize because of their ethical obligations). Others believe that even strategic apologies serve a useful
social function. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 3 (advocating for apologies as shaming sanctions);
Orenstein, supra note 11, at 223 ("Even apologies that originate from self-protection, which are not
entirely sincere or fully contrite, serve a vital social purpose."). On courts' abilities to assess apologies,
see Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!-Remorse, Apology, and
Criminal Sentencing, 38 ARIZ: ST. L.J. 371, 376 (2006) ("[Expressions of remorse] are matters about
which the state is probably incompetent to judge-it cannot even deliver the mail very efficiently . . . .");
Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility:" The Structure,
Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E. I of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
1507, 1564 (1997) (expressing skepticism of courts' ability to detect dishonest apologies).
39. See Levi, supra note 16, at 1171 ("For instance, critics might ask, if a plaintiff settles because
she's emotionally fulfilled by an apology, isn't she being duped out of her legal entitlement-an
entitlement that the apology itself makes concrete?"); Gabriel H. Teninbaum, How Medical Apology
Programs Harm Patients, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 309 (2011) ("[Mlodem apology programs appear to
cool their marks out as a means of preventing them from speaking to a lawyer and becoming educated
about their legal rights.").
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and reputational concerns; therefore, the specter of excessive liability
negatively affects the industry and, especially, physicians who are pressured
to engage in so-called "defensive medicine," (i.e., the prescription of
unwarranted tests and procedures for the sole purpose of reducing their own
liability risk, sometimes to the detriment of the patient).4 0 Both the costs of
liability and those of defensive medicine are then passed on to the public in
the form of higher health costs (or, in other fields, in the form of higher costs
of goods and services). To contain these costs, tort reformers suggest a series
of methods-most prominently, damages caps-that would curb the threat
of excessive liability. Opponents dispute all these ideas. They challenge tort
reformers to provide evidence showing that liability is indeed excessive, that
defensive medicine is prevalent, or that tort reform has any positive effect on
the costs or quality of healthcare.41
To be clear-and clarity is often lacking in this debate-tort reform is
not about making the tort system more efficient per se.42 Both reformers and
their opponents are open to making the system work better at a lower cost.43
The focal point of contention is tort reform's objective to reduce the
deterrent effect of tort liability. Tort reformers believe that damages in
litigation are too high, and so they overly deter potential injurers, such as
physicians, giving rise to "defensive medicine" practices. Therefore, their
call is to cap money damages as a means of abating the over-deterrent effect
of litigation.44
40. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612 (2005) (finding in a survey of 824 physicians
that 93% practice defensive medicine).
41. See, e.g., Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost Curve? Evidence from Texas,
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 176-81, 209-211 (2012) (reviewing the literature and conducting an
empirical analysis of the effect on costs).
42. See generally Carl T. Bogus, Symposium, Introduction: Genuine Tort Reform, 13 ROGER
WLLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2008) (tracking the history of the tort reform movement and noting the specific
political meaning of the term); Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle over Tort Reform and the Overlooked
Legacy ofthe Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943 (2006) (using the state of Ohio as an example to argue
that tort retraction is a political movement driven by economic self-interest).
43. For example, the leading Democratic legislation of the past decade, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, explicitly endorses efficiency-oriented reforms to tort law, prompting states to
"develop and test alternatives to the existing civil litigation system as a way of improving patient safety,
reducing medical errors, encouraging the efficient resolution of disputes, increasing the availability of
prompt and fair resolution of disputes, and improving access to liability insurance, while preserving an
individual's right to seek redress in court."). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 6801(2), 124 Stat. 119, 804.
44. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, A Survey and Some Commentary on Federal "Tort Reform," 39
AKRON L. REV. 909, 910 (2006) (noting that "arguments about tort reform are really arguments about
restricting tort recoveries in one form or another," though the author nonetheless uses a more expansive
definition); Janutis, supra note 42, at 944 (explaining that tort reformers seek to "limit[] the availability
of relief and the amount of relief in personal injury actions"); Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical
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In terms of political economy, the tort reform debate pits consumers and
trial attorneys against professional, commercial, and business interests.45
These opposing camps have mapped on to political parties, with Republicans
being strong proponents of tort reform against the opposition of Democrats,
a somewhat ironic division in light of the history of tort law.4 6 Most notably,
President George W. Bush strongly favored tort reform at the federal level,
calling to cap all money damages at $250,000,47 while President Barack
Obama was largely opposed to damages caps.48
Tort reform has gained a foothold in many states. According to data
collected by Ronen Avraham in 2012, twenty-one states have placed a cap
on non-economic damages, eighteen on punitive damages, and twenty-two
on total compensation.49 Ulrich Matter and Alois Stutzer recently found that
a state having Republican leadership is significantly more likely to undertake
tort reform.50 This is consistent with the findings of our own analysis, which
found that out of twenty-four Republican states, nineteen had caps, whereas
out of twenty-six Democratic states, only sixteen had caps (79% vs. 61%).
But while tort reform has made considerable inroads, it also faces strong
Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises Behind "Tort Reform, " 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETHICS 357, 358 (2005) (explaining tort reform as an attempt to limit victims' rights through caps on
damages). Another pillar of tort reform is the screening of frivolous lawsuits, which tort reformers believe
are common. This would seem to be an attempt to make the system more efficient, but opponents view
this measure as an attempt to curb all litigation, regardless of merit. See David A. Hyman & Charles
Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It 's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1085, 1086-87 (2006) (arguing that the true intent of tort reformers in this area is to make "the system
less remunerative").
45. See Paul H. Rubin, Public Choice and Tort Reform, 124 PUB. CHOICE 223, 230 (2005)
(describing the tension between the different groups); Todd J. Zywicki, Public Choice and Tort Reform
(George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 00-36, 2000) (arguing that lawyers
are pushing for expansion of tort liability). See also Janutis, supra note 42, at 945-46.
46. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Ideological Flip-Flop: American Liberals Are Now the Primary
Supporters of Tort Law, in ESSAYS ON TORT, INSURANCE, LAW AND SOCIETY IN HONOUR OF BILL W.
DUFWA 1105, 1115-19 (Jure Fbrlag, 2006) (identifying tort law with conservative values and suggesting
that Democratic support of the tort system is a recent one); Paul H. Rubin, supra note 45, at 230-31
(explaining the mapping of these interests in partisan terms).
47. Remarks at the University of Scranton in Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1 PUB. PAPERS 57, 62 (Jan.
16, 2003) ("[F]or the sake of affordable and accessible health care, we need a cap on non-economic
damages, of $250,000.").
48. Transcript: President Obama, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Sept. 11, 2009) ("What I would be
willing to do is to consider any ideas out there that would actually work .. .. [but damages] caps will not
do that."). In this interview, President Obama clarified a statement he gave to Congress, acknowledging
the potential importance of defensive medicine. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
Health Care Reform, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1362, 1368 (Sept. 9, 2009).
49. Ronen Avarham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms Clever (5.1), TEX. L.,
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/ravraham/dstlr.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2017).
50. See Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, The Role of Party Politics in Medical Malpractice Tort
Reforms, 42 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 17, 26-27 (2016).
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opposition. First, politically, as we noted, Democratic states are traditionally
averse to tort reform. Second, consumer and attorney lobbying mounts a
strong opposition. And third, various courts have held damages caps
unconstitutional, mostly due to concerns of their limiting effects on the right
to a trial by jury.5 1 These challenges limit he ability of tort reformers to push
forward. The difficulty of advancing their agenda through "the front door"
has put pressure on reformers to find alternative venues for progress, ones
that could sidestep the political, legal, and interest-group deadlock. Realizing
this, tort reformers drew a coterie of unlikely partners-the Legal
Apologists.
C. How TORT REFORMERS FOUGHT AND WON THE APOLOGY BATTLE IN
STATE LEGISLATURES
Much to the envy of legal scholars everywhere, the Legal Apologists
have had a tremendous impact on policy. These ethicists and dispute
resolution specialists found surprising support from the pragmatic and well-
funded tort reform advocates.52 With the rhetoric of the Legal Apologists and
the lobby efforts of tort reformers, the movement struck a chord with
legislators and judges across the country, prompting them to reform the law
to accommodate the use of apologies. Among those lobbying for apology
laws, we find the same actors supporting tort reform: insurance companies,
medical associations, and large companies in diverse industries.53 Those
actors advance their goals using the rhetoric of apologies, suppressing
indications of tort reform.54 In Madison, Wisconsin, for example, "[t]he
medical lobby, supported by powerful business groups, outmaneuvered trial
lawyers" and has managed to pass the "I'm Sorry Bill." 55 This was done by
51. See Bryan J. Chase et al., Are Non-Economic Caps Constitutional?, DEF. COUNS. J. 154, 15-
56 (2015) (reviewing the judicial battle over the constitutionality of non-economic damages caps).
52. NICK SMITH, JUSTICE THROUGH APOLOGIES: REMORSE, REFORM, AND PUNISHMENT 283
(2015) (arguing that "tort reformers often bundle apology legislation within" other tort reform measures);
Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 819, 856 (suggesting
that apology laws depend on support by "insurance companies, medical ssociations and Fortune 500
companies"); Teninbaum, supra note 39, at 311 ("Industry lobbyists exerted influence on lawmakers to
create special medical apology shield laws .... ). See also Runnels, supra note 3, at 484-85 (noting the
lobbying efforts of Sorry Works!, a coalition of physicians, insurers, hospital administrators and patients).
53. See supra note 52.
54. Doug Wojcieszak et al., The Sorry Works! Coalition: Making the Case for Full Disclosure, 32
JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 344, 344 (2006) (portraying apology laws as a
"middle-ground" approach to the "medical malpractice crisis").
55. Cary Spivak & Kevin Crowe, Medical Lobby Is a Powerhouse in Wisconsin Capitol: 'I'm
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referring to compassion rather than to tort reform: "at these difficult times,
people want, need and deserve compassion."56 Similarly, in Massachusetts,
various healthcare organizations lobbied for apology laws explaining this as
a move towards "a very proactive system where physicians can advocate for
patients who are injured rather than being told they can't even talk to
them."
Tort reformers borrowed from Legal Apologists both the means and the
rhetoric to advance their goals. The most important item on the agenda of
reformers was the creation of a "safe harbor" for apologies.58 Apologies
often convey evidence of fault and are therefore admissible at trial.59
Reformers argued, following the Legal Apologists, that using apologies as
evidence of fault is wrong because it punishes the people who "did the right
thing."60 They further argued that existing evidentiary rules intimidate
physicians and other defendants, making them view apologies as "legal
suicide,"61 and thus create an undue and unfair barrier to injurers
apologizing.62 The second item on the reformers' agenda was the promotion
of apologies in less formal settings. Both reformers and legal apologists
sought to promote-for very different reasons, of course-the role of
56. Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Senate Passes Chemotherapy, Cannabis Oil Bills, J. SENTINEL
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsin-senate-is-poised-to-act-on-
police-custody-chemotherapy-bills-b99237082zl -253288731 .html.
57. Debra Beaulieu, Disclosure, Apology and Offer: A New Approach to Medical Liability, MASS.
MED. Soc'Y (June 2012), http://www.massmed.org/News-and-Publications/Vital-Signs/Back-Issues/
Disclosure,-Apology-and-Offer--A-New-Approach-to-Medical-Liability.
58. See Orenstein, supra note 11 (calling for safe-harbor laws); Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty,
Legal Consequences ofApologizing, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 128-29 (1996) (providing early support
to apology safe-harbor laws). The nation's apology laws originate in Massachusetts; a retired legislator's
daughter was hit by a car but the driver refused to apologize because of fear of legal liability. This led to
the adoption of the first apology law. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (LexisNexis 2017); Taft,
supra note 37, at 1051-52.
59. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). Federal law only protects apologies if they are made during
settlement negotiations. See FED R. EVID. 408; Cohen, supra note 11, at 1032-36. An apology might also
be inadmissible if it is implied from an offer to cover medical expenses. See FED R. EVID. 409. The
rationale for this rule is that "such payment or offer [to pay the victim's medical expenses] is usually
made from humane impulses and not from an admission of liability, and that to hold otherwise would
tend to discourage assistance to the injured person." FED. R. EVID. 409 advisory committee's note.
60. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 864 ("The law should not punish people who take moral steps.");
Orenstein, supra note 11, at 235-36 ("[A] justification for [these rules] arises from a desire to reward
goodness. ... We do not want to punish the 'blessed peacemakers' . . . . We certainly do not want to
disadvantage individuals who do the right thing.").
61. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 50.
62. See Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 25, at 465 ("The conventional wisdom among
legal actors has been that an apology will be viewed as an admission of responsibility and will lead to
increased legal liability . . . .") (Robbennolt also notes, however, that there is no empirical research to
support this perception.). See also Cohen, supra note 11, at 1010 ("If a lawyer contemplates an apology,
it may well be with a skeptical eye: Don't risk apology, it will just create liability.").
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apologies in mediation,63 settlement procedures,64 and the early stages of
trial.65 Finally, the third item was more institutional-providing judges with
the power to mandate apologies as an additional or substitute aspect of
sanctions.66
Reformers have been extremely successful, conquering thirty-six state
legislatures in only a decade.67  Additionally, courts have seemed to
internalize apology norms.68 Some courts are said to apply these norms "with
gusto,"69 leading them to treat apologies as valid grounds for mitigating
63. See Levi, supra note 16.
64. See Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 292 (2001).
65. See Etienne &. Robbennolt, supra note 16, at 299 ("[E]ncouraging apologies in earlier stages
of the criminal law process may be a laudable goal . . . ."); Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 128-
29 (advocating that the tender of an apology would lead to lenient charges, foregoing of arrests, and
deferment of prosecutions).
66. Compare Latif, supra note 64, at 311 (forced apologies "can mitigate anger, shame or educate
the offender, or improve prospects for settlements"); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal
Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 50-57 (1997) (advocating an
equitable remedy of apologies in civil litigation); White, supra note 16, at 1297 ("Requiring unrepentant
officials to endure a small amount of psychological discomfort [through coerced apologies] is a small
price to pay to help injured individuals."), with Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park
Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881, 890 (Pa. 1973) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) ("An apology is a
communication of the emotion of remorse for one's past acts. To order up that particular emotion, or any
other emotion, is beyond the reach of any government .... ); Levi, supra note 16, at 1178 (arguing that
involuntary apology is "just talk"). See generally Nick Smith, Against Court-Ordered Apologies, 16 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that court-ordered apologies erve little function).
67. See Latif, supra note 64, at 301 (reporting on California, Massachusetts, and Texas in 2001).
For a comparison with thirty-six states today, see Edward Adams, Apology Protection Laws Letting
Physicians be Human, EBS CONSULTING (Mar. 2, 2016), http://blog.ebs-consulting.com/apology-
protection-laws-in-36-states-letting-physicians- be-human-again. See also Ebert, supra note 19, at 366;
Zisk, supra note 19, at 375 & n.43. The most prevalent form of apology laws is a safe harbor for
expressions of sympathy and empathy (e.g., "I am sorry you were hurt."). See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 26-1-814 (2017) (providing a safe harbor for statements "expressing apology, sympathy,
commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense ofbenevolence relating to the pain, suffering,
or death of a person"). Several states provide a more robust protection and make inadmissible even
liability-assuming apologies (e.g., "I am sorry I hurt you through my negligence."). See, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 233, § 79L (West 2012).
68. Judges are reluctant to allow an apologetic admission of guilt to be the sole basis for
establishing the breach of a duty of care. In the medical context, see Ebert, supra note 19, at 349 ("[T]he
use of apologies and other extrajudicial statements made by the physician following a medical error are
not alone sufficient to prove negligence."). See also Lashley v. Koeber, 156 P.2d 441, 442, 445 (Cal.
1945) (finding that a physician's admission that a mistake is "'all my own' is "insufficient to establish
negligence"); Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849, 850 (Vt. 1992) (finding that a doctor's apology is
insufficient to establish a breach of standard of care). But see Senesac v. Assocs. in Obstetrics &
Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900, 901 (Vt. 1982) ("It is conceivable that in some circumstances the extrajudicial
admission of a defendant physician could establish a prima facie case of negligence . . . ."). For more
examples, see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 634 &
nn.171-72 (1996) (citing various examples of court-ordered apologies).
69. White, supra note 16, at 1268-69. See also Latif, supra note 64, at 296-98.
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money damages,7 0 lowering sentencing,7' and exempting legal liability for
crimes.7 2 This fast adoption amazed many: "Shortly after the idea of
excluding apologies from admissibility into evidence was raised in academic
circles . . . it rapidly spread to the policy arena."73 Yet, this success has not
satiated reformers' appetite; they now seek to expand the scope of apology
laws,74 apply them to other areas of civil and criminal law,75 enact them at
the federal level,76 and make them more uniform. Additionally, some
advocate that judges be able to compel the government to apologize in civil
rights cases.7 8
Tort reformers managed an impressive feat. On the one hand, they drew
on the resources and financial support of business interests that invest
hundreds of millions of dollars each year to advance tort reform.79 On the
other hand, they garnered broad bipartisan support. They even swayed
consumer advocates and lawyers who were willing to withdraw their
traditional opposition to tort reform in this context.80 Remarkably, despite
70. See, e.g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 506 n.l 1 (1972) (noting the frequency of mitigated
penalties for contempt following an apology); Johnson v. Smith, 890 F. Supp. 726, 729 n.6 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (noting that a prompt apology mitigates punitive damages). See generally Rehm & Beatty, supra
note 58 (reviewing the legal effects of an apology).
71. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 & cmt. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016) (providing for sentence reductions of two to three levels following clear demonstrations of
acceptance of responsibility); Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 92-95 (showing how criminal law
positively accounts for apologies in sentencing).
72. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 3, at 367 (reporting a judge's substitution of a letter of
apology for a ten-year sentence for embezzlement).
73. Cohen, supra note 52, at 819. See also Gailey, supra note 3, at 178-81 (surveying the
development of state apology laws).
74. See, e.g., Matthew Pillsbury, Say Sorry and Save: A Practical Argumentfor a Greater Role for
Apologies in Medical Malpractice Law, 1 S. NEw ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 171, 200 (2006) ("As
for situations where apologies are admissible, courts and lawmakers across the country can learn from
the strides made by their counterparts in other states [where apologies are protected].").
75. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 13, at 580-81 (advocating for an "apology privilege" that would
create a safe harbor for apologies in criminal proceedings).
76. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1061-62; Kahan & Posner supra note 3, at 367. See also
Helmreich, supra note 21, at 603-04.
77. See Zisk, supra note 19, at 377-78 (noting that in Iowa, chiropractors are protected when they
apologize, but chefs are not). See also IOWA CODE § 622.31 (2015) (making inadmissible in civil tort
cases the apologies extended by licensed professionals).
78. See White, supra note 16, at 1273-74 (advocating the use of court-coerced apologies as a civil
rights remedy).
79. Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice
Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S183, S184 (2007).
80. PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BRIEFING BOOK: CHALLENGING THE MISLEADING
CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS' LOBBY 85 (2004) (suggesting apology laws as an alternative to tort reform);
Pennsylvania Governor Signs Benevolent Gesture Medical Professional Liability Act, CLAIMS J. (Oct.
25, 2013), http://www.claimsjoumal.com/news/east/2013/10/25/238945.htm (reporting that after a
decade of back and forth battles between doctors and lawyers "the two professions recently changed
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his known opposition to tort reform, then-Senator Barack Obama co-
sponsored a bill with Hillary Clinton that sought to establish federal apology
safe harbors.8' Indeed, Democratic lawmakers still seem as keen to adopt
apology laws as Republican lawmakers, as evidenced by wide adoption in
both blue and red states.82
In sum, apology laws are promoted using the rhetoric of virtue,
improved communications, and ethics developed by legal intellectuals. What
is never explicitly noted, let alone considered, are the broader effects of
apology laws on incentives, harms, and other social costs. These issues are
simply suppressed, and apology laws are framed as a neutral measure that
improves dispute resolution without sacrificing victims' rights. The
acceptance of these laws by those who traditionally oppose tort reform thus
presents something of a paradox. It is our task now to show why apology
laws undercut deterrence and are thus, in effect, comparable to other
measures of tort reform.
II. COMMERCIAL APOLOGIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE
We have seen that tort reformers have joined hands with legal scholars
and have managed to change the law in most states. This Part first provides
a theoretical framework for evaluating the effect of apologies on behavior.
This theory highlights the importance of the cost and effectiveness of
apologies to the evaluation of the social desirability of apology laws; given
that, this Part considers both issues separately, showing how the costs of
commercial apologies are declining while their effectiveness remains robust.
A. A THEORY OF APOLOGIES
1. The Goals of Tort Law and Apologies
The Legal Apologists have over-emphasized the importance of
apologies in controlling the costs of disputes and litigation.83 They argue that
apologies help curb litigation by dissipating victims' anger and need for
lobbying tactics by mutually agreeing on a new reform that both sides say will help.").
81. See National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation (MEDiC) Act, S.1784, 109th Cong.
(2005); Hillary Rodham Clinton & Barack Obama, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2205, 2206 (2006) (discussing the MEDiC Act); Runnels, supra note 3, at 156 (discussing
the MEDiC Act).
82. Ho & Liu, Does Sorry Work?, supra note 9, at 144 n.5 (noting that regression analysis shows
that "political composition in the State Senate and State House has no significant explanatory power on
the passage of apology laws," and also finding that apology laws are not correlated with other tort
reforms).
83. See supra note 21.
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vengeance. In support of this view, they marshal some empirical evidence-
although we note that more recent findings cast doubt on the strength of this
argument.84 These newer findings notwithstanding, the Legal Apologists
argue that apologies are socially desirable as they lead to lower levels of
litigation, thus saving unnecessary waste. While controlling litigation costs
is advantageous, tort law takes a much broader view where litigation costs
play only a secondary role. The two primary goals of tort law are
compensation of victims and deterrence of wrongdoers; the reduction of
litigation costs is an important, but secondary goal.8 5
What has been missing from the Legal Apologists' analysis is the effect
of apologies on deterrence. In a fundamental oversight, the Legal Apologists
have failed to account for this central goal of tort law. Thus, they have never
accounted for the ex-ante effects of apologies on primary behavior. How
does the possibility of apologizing after the fact affect injurers' decisions to
engage in harmful activities in the first place? How do apologies change the
level of behavior? Would a more favorable treatment of apologies by the
legal system induce or suppress accidents? Once considered, reflection
reveals a tension between apologies and deterrence. To the extent that
apologies reduce the cost of an accident for the injurer-which is the point
just discussed-they also provide the injurer with less of a reason to avoid
the accident. Put differently, if apologies allow the injurer to limit exposure
to liability, then the injurer has-all other things being equal-much less
incentive to avoid the activity or to invest in precautions. This does not mean
that the injurer will not care at all, or that the effect of apologies is necessarily
negative, but it does imply that injurers will have less incentive to take care
than they would otherwise.86
Before discussing the effect of apologies on deterrence, it is important
to pause and reflect on the other primary goal of tort remedies:
compensation. The common understanding of the compensation goal is to
restore the victim to the status quo ante-prior to the accident-by providing
84. See infra Part II.C.
85. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192-93 (2004); Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 499-501 (1961)
(discussing the issue of loss spreading). See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Compensation as a Tort Norm,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 65 (2013) (advancing compensation as the
central goal of tort law); Shavell & Polinsky, supra note 23 (critically assessing the effectiveness of tort
law in meeting these goals in the context of product liability).
86. Of course, it may well be that there is too much deterrence in the baseline, so the change will
be favorable. However, there are many reasons to believe that the tort system generally under-deters,
especially given injurers' ability to shield assets after an accident. See generally Yonathan A. Arbel,
Shielding ofAssets and Lending Contracts, 48 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 26 (2016).
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money damages that approximate the loss.87 Stated this way, it is clear that
apologies undercut the compensation goal because-as demonstrated by the
Apologists themselves-victims are willing to accept lower payments in
settlements when an apology is tendered.88 Despite this apparent difficulty,
the Legal Apologists argue that apologies are compensatory, on the theory
that apologies have therapeutic value. The Legal Apologists claim that
judging the adequacy of apologies with money is inadequate, as it does not
capture the positive emotional and expressive effect of apologies on the
victims' well-being. Some go as far as arguing that apologies can heal some
of the harms inflicted by the injurer, restoring a sense of self-worth to victims
who feel deprived of autonomy by the injurer's seeming disregard to their
welfare.
There are strong reasons to be skeptical of the therapeutic value theory,
particularly in the context of commercial apologies, and we cover five of
those here. While the adherents of the therapeutic value theory argue that
victims' acceptance of apologies is evidence of their value, there are several
alternative, less benign, reasons why victims might accept them-and
sometimes forgo hundreds of thousands in compensation.89 The first two
reasons a victim may accept an apology unwillingly have to do with pressure
and manipulation. For example, Gabriel Teninbaum recently documented
how apologies are strategically used by sophisticated commercial firms as
means of beguiling victims.90 Teninbaum's account highlights certain
apology practices used by firms that are meant to create emotional pressure
on victims to accept them, a decision that the victim will later come to
regret.9 1 The strategic, deliberate use of apologies by commercial firms is
designed to maximize this effect, and victims employ only limited agency in
their decision to accept the apology. A second reason concerns pressure that
comes from sources besides the injurer. Pursuant to an apology, victims may
still wish to sue; however, they are often subject to social or internal
pressures to avoid doing so, lest they be perceived as vengeful, unrelenting,
or ungrateful. Research in psychology shows that failure to accept an
87. See Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. [18801 5 App. Cas. 25 (HL) 39 (appeal taken from
Scot.) (Blackburn, L.) ("In settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should
as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has
suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong . . .
88. See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 25, at 148-50.
89. See infra Part II.C.
90. See Teninbaum, supra note 39, at 309.
91. Id. at 332 ("On its own, convincing an individual not to sue is no different than any other 'bad'
settlement. What makes this different is the appearance of a system of methods designed to dissuade
patients from actually considering their rights before settling for short money.").
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apology is associated with a negative perception of the victim.92 Similarly,
victims may experience internal or social pressures (perceived or real) not to
sue, due to the social norm of accepting apologies.93 Thirdly, the
asymmetries of power between victims and companies tend to lead to under-
participation of consumers in the legal process, which means that the
expected compensation will also tend to be lower.94
Two other reasons are more epistemological in nature. There is a real
question as to whether people understand the meaning of commercial
apologies and how they are different from interpersonal ones. When a firm
apologizes through one of its proxies, is that an expression of guilt? Of
whom? Given how dispersed the decisions and actions in a commercial firm
are, even an apology by the CEO reflects only a sliver of the actual
responsibility for the accident (aside from the very general sense in which
the CEO is the personification of the firm, a loaded idea by itself).95 What
does the apology say about the future? Would a commercial firm be less
likely to recidivate after an apology? The meaning of such an apology is an
open question. This leads us to the other reason, which has to do with firm
anthropomorphism. It is well known that people do not maintain a clear
distinction between individuals and firms, tending to endow brands and firms
with personality.96 Humans have a strong tendency-potentially related to
evolutionary reasons-to accept apologies from other humans.97 The
92. See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, "I've Said I'm Sorry, Haven't I? "A Study of the
Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL.
10, 10 (1994). See also Joost M. Leunissen et al., The Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries Between Victim's
Need for Apologies and Perpetrator's Willingness to Apologize, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
315, 315 (2013) ("Victims of transgressions are, in turn, socialized into graciously accepting such
apologies."). This is in line with the view of some economists that apologies create a "psychic cost" to
suing. See Ho & Liu, Does Sorry Work?, supra note 9, at 148.
93. Some moral philosophers believe that there exists a duty to forgive. See CHARLES GRISWOLD,
FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 67 (2007) ("[U]nder certain conditions it would be
blameworthy not to forgive ... ."); Espen Gamlund, The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers, 18 INT.
J. PHILOSOPHICAL STUD. 651, 651-52 (2010) (arguing that a limited duty to forgive exists, and so it is
possible that some people have a mistaken sense of duty to accept apologies, even when they are not
genuine).
94. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (surveying the participation gap and proposing an institutional solution).
95. On the diffusion of responsibility in firms, see infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.3.
96. See Martin Eisend & Nicola E. Stokburger-Sauer, Brand Personality: A Meta-Analytic Review
of Antecedents and Consequences, 24 MARKETING LETTERS 205, 205 (2013) ("In their pursuit of
fulfilling self-definitional needs, individuals tend to increasingly perceive brands as relationship
partners."). Brand personality is understood as "the set of human characteristics associated with a brand."
Jennifer L. Aaker, Dimensions ofBrand Personality, 34 J. MARKETING RES. 347, 347 (1997).
97. See Yohsuke Ohtsubo & Esuka Watanabe, Do Sincere Apologies Need to Be Costly? Test of a
Costly Signaling Model of Apology, 30 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 114, 114, 120-22 (2009)
(considering apologies as an evolutionary adaptation).
1218 [Vol. 90:1199
TORT REFORM THROUGH THE BACK DOOR
concern is that people instinctively interpret apologies as commitments not
to recidivate-commitments that are more plausible in interpersonal settings,
where apology involves some humiliation and other emotional costs, than in
commercial settings, where decisions can be made much more strategically
and impersonally. This is reminiscent of how people tend to view certain
brands and companies as "warm," or as "evil"-a phenomenon known as
brand personification.98
The final flaw, and perhaps the most fundamental one, is the unrealistic
magnitude of the hypothesized therapeutic effect. Even if apologies have
some healing effect, there must be some limit to the size of this effect. The
contention that individuals engage in a conscious trade-off of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary benefits, preferring the latter to the former, is more
convincing if we find actual evidence of a trade-off, of some
commensurability of values. But, if victims forgo amounts that are not
proportional to the harm they suffered, this casts doubt on the theory that
there is a real trade-off of benefits. If the victim of an accident suffers a harm
that would require a very costly surgery to repair, it is not convincing to
argue that they are better-off accepting an apology than the money needed to
afford the surgery. In practice, we will show, the effect of commercial
apologies can be measured sometimes in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars, a fact that puts considerable pressure on the therapeutic value
theory.99
Overall, the idea that apologies erve compensation goals rests on shaky
grounds. This is troubling, since the contention-while superficially
appealing-is actually quite strong. It asks us to believe that victims
rationally decide to accept apologies, that companies do not take advantage
of the emotional instability that often follows an accident, that individuals
fully understand and internalize the subtle differences between interpersonal
and commercial apologies, and, above all, that the value of apologies to
victims is so high that they will be willing to trade an apology for money that
could be used to support their actual, physical recovery. The following
thought experiment perhaps captures the source of this skepticism. Consider
the common victim of medical malpractice, who suffered a great harm from
negligent treatment. Suppose that after the accident, the victim receives an
apology from the hospital staff or the physician, and as a consequence,
decides to drop the lawsuit. Going back in time but knowing what the patient
knows now, would the patient undergo the same procedure again? If the
98. See generally Ronald Jay Cohen, Brand Personification: Introduction and Overview, 31
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 461 (2010) (discussing the concept of brand personification).
99. See infra Part II.C.
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answer is negative, then it is unlikely that the apology really mended the
harm and fully compensated the victim for the loss, and it is more likely that
other factors came to bear on the victim's decision. Seeing that compensation
fails to provide support for the use of apologies, we are left with the tension
between the goal of deterrence and the goal of minimizing dispute costs. To
account for this complexity, we need a theory that accounts for the combined
effects of cost-reduction and deterrence.
2. A Unified Theory of Apologies in Tort Law
To evaluate the combined effect of apologies on behavior, we extend
the traditional model of accidents in tort law to account for apologies. An
informal presentation follows here, and the interested reader can find the
formal explication in the Appendix.
In the basic model of tort liability, a potential injurer chooses whether
to engage in a risky activity. The activity has some benefit to the injurer but
may cause harm to the victim. The prototypical example of this model is
driving and the potential risk of an accident to a pedestrian. An important
aspect of the model is that litigation over the accident is costly. To win the
case, each party has to expend resources on retaining lawyers, hiring expert
witnesses, producing evidence, etc. In addition to these litigation costs, there
are also liability costs, which reflect the payments the injurer would have to
pay the victim if found liable (or if the parties settle). The social goal is to
find rules that minimize costs.00 On this point, it is worth emphasizing that
the economic analysis does not consider the payment of liability costs to have
any direct effect on social welfare-when a person pays an amount to
another person, then the second person becomes richer (a social benefit), but
this benefit is completely offset by the loss of the first person.
To account for apologies, we add to the model the possibility that if an
accident occurs, the injurer may choose to apologize. Apologizing involves
both costs and benefits. Starting with the benefits, we observe that victims,
when presented with an apology, are willing to settle more often than they
otherwise would. Additionally, victims are willing to accept lower payments
in their settlement agreements (which also facilitate the higher rate of
settlements).o0 It is important to recognize that these are two distinct effects,
as the former economizes litigation costs for both parties, and the latter saves
on liability costs only to the injurer. Besides these benefits, there are costs to
100. See supra note 21.
101. See infra Part II.C.
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apology, which may involve loss of face, social stature, or reputation.102
Tendering an apology is a private cost that is borne by the injurer.
Are apologies after an accident socially desirable? Based on the
extended model, we will now argue that the injurer will tend to apologize in
a way that diverges from the social optimum, apologizing too little or too
much, a point of concern that was not fully recognized in the literature.103 To
see that, consider first the private incentive to apologize, from the viewpoint
of the injurer. From this perspective, the tender of the apology will involve
a cost that the injurer bears, but the apology will also have a double benefit-
saving the injurer both litigation and liability costs. If the benefits exceed the
cost of apologizing, the injurer would have an incentive to apologize.
From a social perspective, the calculus is markedly different. The costs
remain the same as before-whatever cost is involved in tendering the
apology will also reflect a cost to society. The benefit of saving on litigation
costs also remains stable-society saves the costs the parties would have
spent on attorneys and litigation (in fact, society also counts the savings to
the victim, which the injurer will not see). What changes is the effect of
liability costs. From a social perspective, it does not matter that the injurer
saves money by paying less to the victim, as the victim sustains a loss that is
exactly equal to the injurer's saving. This disagreement between the injurer's
private incentive and the social point of view leads the injurer to apologize
too much or too little. 104
Example 1. Suppose that an accidental poisonous leak from a nearby
factory caused the victim a harm of $5,000. Further, suppose that tendering
an apology would cost $500, but that through this apology, the parties settle
the case-thus, each avoiding $200 in litigation costs. Finally, suppose that
because of the apology, the victim is willing to accept a payment of $2,500,
rather than the $5,000 the victim would have received in litigation. In this
example, an apology will not be socially desirable, as it costs $500, but only
saves a total of $400 in litigation costs (recall that the offender's $2,500
savings is equal to the victim's loss). On the other hand, by apologizing, the
102. For example, one public official preferred being sent to prison rather than to a halfway house,
because he did not want to apologize. See White, supra note 16, at 1269. See also Ebert, supra note 19,
at 334-35 (discussing ego and the difficulty physicians face in admitting their professional shortcomings).
103. For a similar argument in the broader context of litigation, see Steven Shavell, The
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL
STuD. 575, 575 (1997) (explaining that there would generally be too little or too much litigation, because
parties' private incentives to bring suit will often be too weak or too strong relative to the social optimum).
104. Note that at this stage, we do not take into account the possibility that making the injurer pay
will reduce the incentive to harm in the future. The analysis so far is made "ex-post," that is, under the
assumption that an accident has already happened.
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injurer could save $2,700 ($2,500 + $200) at a cost of only $400, thus
creating an incentive to apologize. Since the private incentive to apologize
exceeds what is socially desirable, there will be too much of an incentive to
apologize.
Example la. Suppose now that the apology costs only $300 to tender,
but that it does not reduce the settlement amount. In this case, the apology
will be socially valuable, as by investing $300, a total of $400 in litigation
expenses can be saved. The offender, however, will not have an incentive to
invest $300, as this will only help save their own litigation costs of $200.
We see that the social and private incentives to apologize may diverge.
We would expect there to be too many apologies under a combination of the
following circumstances: (1) apologies have a strong effect on victims'
willingness to forgo parts of their claims, (2) injurers' litigation costs are
high, and (3) apologies are cheap. Indeed, there may also be cases where
injurers will have too little incentive to apologize, in which case, apology
laws would be desirable. Which of these two options is more probable has to
do with one's assessment of the magnitude of the cost of tendering an
apology relative to the effect of apology on the victim. The stronger the
effect, or the lower the cost of apologies, the more we will be concerned with
having too many apologies.
The analysis should not stop here. How would the ability to apologize
affect the decision to undertake the risky activity in the first place? Tort
theory recognizes that injurer's decisions will be affected by how much the
injurer can anticipate having to pay should an accident occur. Under the
standard analysis, it is suggested that if the expected payment will be equal
to the harm, the injurer would have optimal incentives.0 5 For example, with
a sanction equal to the harm, a factory will not produce goods with a value
of $5,000 if the expected harm from a pollution-related accident exceeds
$5,000. Making the factory owner pay $5,000 in the event of an accident
would make sure it would only have an incentive to produce when the value
of the goods exceeds $5,000.
This result changes when we consider apologies. When contemplating
the possibility of an accident, the injurer would take into account several
costs. If no apology is tendered, these costs include the expected costs of
105. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15
GA. L. REV. 851, 870 (1981); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33
(1972). See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach ofContract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341-43 (1985) (discussing optimal remedies in the
context of contract law).
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litigation and the costs of liability (e.g., $5,000).106 And if the injurer decides
to tender an apology, then as just analyzed, the injurer will save some of the
costs of litigation and liability, but will have to pay for the apology itself. In
this sense, the cost of delivering the apology can be thought of as a self-
inflicted punishment. Nonetheless, the injurer does not have to apologize,
and will only do so if the apology is, on net, privately beneficial. It follows
that the injurer will only apologize if this is expected to reduce the injurer's
costs. This point emphasizes that the only potential effect of apologies is to
reduce liability.
Part of this reduction in payments is benign, as apologies encourage
settlement of cases that would otherwise be litigated. The savings on
litigation due to a greater propensity to settle is thus a positive feature of
apologies. But apologies do more than encourage settlements: they also
reduce payments the injurer would have to make to victims. Because injurers
care about their own private costs in the event of an accident, this reduction
means that injurers have less to worry about if an accident occurs and less
interest to take precautions against such an accident. Overall, then, apologies
dilute deterrence.
Example 2. Suppose now that a factory owner thinks about using a
production technique that would save $4,000 in production costs, but will
cause one of the neighbors a harm of $5,000 in pollution costs. Suppose also,
as before, that apology costs $400 to tender, and that it leads to a settlement
of $2,500, thus saving $200 in litigation costs for both the factory owner and
the neighbor. We have already noted that the factory owner will have an
incentive to apologize in this case. Given that, the factory owner knows that
if she decides to use this production technique, she will gain $4,000 in
savings, and her costs from an accident would be $2,900 (apology cost plus
the settlement payment). Hence, the factory owner will have an incentive to
undertake the activity, pocketing the $1,100 difference. From a social
perspective, however, the activity causes a harm of at least $5,000 and only
has a benefit of $4,000,107 thus making it undesirable.
Example 2a. Suppose, as in la, that the apology costs $300 to tender
and that it does not reduce the amount in settlement. In this case, as we have
seen, the injurer will not apologize; hence apologies will not have any effect
on behavior. More generally, if apologies are very costly to make, they will
106. We are assuming, as is conventional, that liability is set to equal the harm, but not to equal the
harm plus litigation costs. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Costly Litigation and Optimal
Damages, 37 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 86, 86 (2014).
107. To be precise, the total harm given an apology here is $5,800, which includes the litigation
costs of both parties and the cost of tendering the apology.
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not influence behavior.
Tying the analysis together, apologies may lead to unwanted behavior
when they are cheap and effective. After an accident, there may be an
excessive incentive for the injurer to apologize. This concern will be most
pressing when, among other things, apologies are cheap and effective in
terms of their effect on victims' demands in settlement negotiations. Before
an accident occurs, apologies would tend to reduce the injurer's incentive to
take care, a problem that is again most pressing when apologies are cheap
and effective. It should be emphasized that this does not mean that apologies
are always undesirable; if the apology reduces the cost of an accident to the
injurer by less than the savings it entails in litigation costs to both parties, it
is desirable. However, once the effect of an apology exceeds that amount,
apologies are no longer socially desirable, as the encouragement of risky
behavior exceeds the value of saving on litigation costs. The main conclusion
here is worth repeating: if apologies are cheap and effective, in terms of
reducing the amounts victims ask for, they are undesirable.
The analysis also carries a strong normative message. The law
influences the "cost" of apologies because making them privileged reduces
their downside, thus making them cheaper. The literature shows no
appreciation of the notion that there is an advantage to apologies being
costly, and that we may already have excessive apologies. Because of that,
the central theme in the literature is that apologies should unconditionally be
made cheaper-an idea that should be rejected on grounds of public safety.
The analysis further suggests that there is an optimal level of cost of
apologies: to the extent that legislators can influence apology costs, they
should set apology costs cheap enough to encourage apologies to reflect the
savings from litigation costs, but no more than that.
B. COMMERCIAL APOLOGIES IN PRACTICE
For individuals, "sorry" may be the hardest word. But when commercial
players enter the arena and the stakes are high, the balance of the costs and
benefits of apologies changes.08 As the theoretical framework highlights the
importance of the costs of apologies, we move now to illustrate how these
costs tend to be (relatively) low or are on the decline, through four different
mechanisms.
108. See, e.g., Yonathan A. Arbel, Contract Remedies in Action: Specific Performance, 118 W. VA.
L. REV. 369, 398-99 (finding that animosity plays a lesser role between commercial parties).
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1. Delegation and Specialization
When an individual tries to render an apology, they are limited by their
own abilities. If they are bad communicators, seem insincere, or are
uncharismatic, then they may easily botch the apology. individuals only have
themselves to work with, and it will normally not do to send someone else
to apologize on their behalf.1 09 With commercial apologies, the situation is
very different. Corporations, by necessity, delegate their tasks to individuals.
This ability to delegate confers on corporations a unique advantage, as it
allows them some leeway in the choice of the individual to tender the
apology.10 By selecting the best apologizers, a firm's apology can be made
as good as its best employee. This can be crucial, as different individuals
have remarkably different abilities when it comes to apologies. Here, the BP
oil spill case is especially illustrative. After having recognized that the
CEO's apology did not go over well,"' the company realized that its apology
was ineffective because the CEO was not an American and thus was not
viewed as part of the affected group. 12 The company pivoted and delegated
the task of apologizing to local, ethnically diverse employees, who were
members of communities affected by the spill.11 3 BP ran television ads
featuring these employees representing the company, who clearly identified
themselves as Gulf Coast area locals and communicated their personal grief
as a result of the accident."14
Certain social expectations constrain the ability to delegate apology
tasks, such as the expectation that the apologizing party will be related to the
wrong (e.g., an attending physician) or that the CEO will assume residual
responsibility, in the spirit of President Truman's famous plaque stating that
"The Buck Stops Here." 115 On reflection, however, this constraint leaves
considerable slack. In many corporate settings, each action of the corporation
is a composite of many different actions and decisions taken by a diffused
109. See, e.g., Holley S. Hodgins & Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents
and Consequences, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 310 (2003).
110. In some cases, it may be expected that the CEO or a specific employee will make the apology.
But in practice, it seems that most corporate apologies are delivered by various other employees, including
customer representatives.
111. See O'Hara O'Connor, supra note 10, at 1985.
112. See id at l986.
113. Id. at 1989.
114. Id. See also, e.g BP, BP Gulf Coast Update: Our Ongoing Commitment, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20,
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-hoOflR4Vklo ("I was born here, I'm still here, and so is BP.
We're committed to the Gulf. For everyone who loves it and everyone who calls it home.") (apology
presented by Iris Cross, BP Community Outreach).
115. "The Buck Stops Here" Desk Sign, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBR. & MUSEUM,
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).
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mass. There is no natural way to assign blame to a single employee for a
defective automobile coming off the assembly line. Similarly, there may not
be any natural candidate for an apology. Likewise, while some medical
procedures involve one physician or nurse, many involve more than one,
which creates a natural choice space for the hospital or medical facility.
(Observe that patients will not always know who was really responsible for
a given action, or even know who was treating them). Even the expectation
that an apology will be tendered by corporate leaders leaves room for
discretion, as the company can hire managers who are especially adept at
apologizing, and may create corporate positions that are mostly symbolic to
fulfill functions such as public relations, social responsibility, and apologies.
Finally, commercial entities are not even limited to their current staff. They
can, and routinely do, retain specialized experts for the management of
crises, such as mediators, actors, and celebrities. A company may choose to
install, for example, a personable CEO in times of crisis. Likable employees
have significant effects: as one medical malpractice practitioner reported,
patients "never sue the nice, contrite doctors. Their patients never call our
offices." 16
2. Professionalization and Training
To be effective, an apology needs to be-or at least appear to be-
sincere. However, sincerity is never observed, only inferred; a victim must
resort to extrinsic evidence and heuristics to assess the authenticity of an
apology. A body of scholarship has developed around learning these
heuristics and how to exploit their weaknesses. Experts have shown, for
example, how injurers can structure apologies for maximal effect by
leveraging in-group bias,117 using effective language,1 18 choosing the right
116. Wojcieszak et al., supra note 54, at 347. See also Bruce W. Neckers, The Art of the Apology,
81 MICH. B.J. 10, 11 (2002) (recounting the story of a client who said that an apology would substitute
for a lawsuit).
117. For example, Erin O'Hara O'Connor suggests that corporate wrongdoers may use local
spokespeople in their apologies to maximize effect. O'Hara O'Connor, supra note 10, at 1986 (noting
that the corporate apology was ineffective because the CEO had a "thick British accent" which "probably
exacerbated the negative connotations of his resentful statements because it pegged him and the company
as foreign").
118. See, e.g., Ameeta Patel & Lamar Reinsch, Companies Can Apologize. Corporate Apologies
and Legal Liability, 66 Bus. COMM. Q., March 13, 2003, at 9, 21-22 (arguing that corporations can reap
the benefits of apologies with diminished legal exposure by switching from active language (e.g., "I am
sorry for hurting you") to passive language (e.g., "I am sorry you were hurt")).
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employees for the task,1 9 and timing apologies correctly.1 20
These lessons are taught to commercial actors by specialized firms
through seminars and workshops. Such firms help organizations implement
apologies as part of their workflow, suggest ways to streamline the process
of apologies, and offer best practices.121 One such example is Sorry Works!,
an advocacy organization and a training company claiming to have trained
"tens of thousands of healthcare, insurance, and legal professionals around
the country" on how to use disclosure and apology to combat medical
malpractice suits.122 The experience of the "3Rs Program," instituted by the
Colorado physician-trust COPIC, is another telling example: as part of the
program, physicians are coached on effective apologies, training them on
timing, structure, and content.123
Professionalization and training in the area of apologies gives
commercial actors a unique advantage. They allow these commercial actors
to apologize more effectively and at a lower cost, and to benefit from
accumulated knowledge and experience.
3. Diffusion of Responsibility
Commercial entities enjoy a psychological advantage, both because
they find apologies easier to tender and because they require a lower
psychological cost for the employee, relative to an apology done in
interpersonal settings. Psychologists argue that an effective apology requires
a person to create the impression of separate parts of their personality: a past
offender, who committed a wrong and is thus worthy of scorn; and a present
repentant apologizer, who deserves forgiveness.1 24 This is a challenging task
119. See generally Leanne Ten Brinke & Gabrielle S. Adams, Saving Face? When Emotional
Displays During Public Apologies Mitigate Damage to Organizational Performance, 130
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 (2015) (studying the market effects of facial
cues given by corporate wrongdoers).
120. See generally Jochen Wirtz & Anna S. Mattila, Consumer Responses to Compensation, Speed
of Recovery and Apology after a Service Failure, 15 INT'L J. SERV. INDUSTRY MGMT. 150 (2004)
(studying the effects of timing on apologies).
121. For example, many corporations have strict guidelines on complaint handling that include
guidelines on apologies. See Christian Homburg & Andreas First, How Organizational Complaint
Handling Drives Customer Loyalty: An Analysis of the Mechanistic and the Organic Approach, 69 J.
MARKETING 95, 99 (2005).
122. Our History & Mission, SORRY WORKS!, https://sorryworks.net/history-and-mission (last
visited Sept. 7, 2017).
123. See Teninbaum, supra note 39, at 317.
124. See generally Peter H. Kim et al., Removing the Shadow ofSuspicion: The Effects ofApology
Versus Denial for Repairing Competence- Versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 104 (2004) (analyzing the differing effects of apologies and denials on repairing trust after
alleged violations). A famous articulation of this idea is by sociologist Erving Goffman: "An apology is
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because the more one accepts responsibility, the more one might inspire
indignation, whereas assuming too little responsibility may be taken as a
failure to take ownership of the wrongdoing. For a diffused commercial
entity, this difficulty may be less severe because the party apologizing and
the party at fault are not necessarily the same person. We have noted above
how corporate actions are a composite of many different decisions of various
individuals, which dilutes the responsibility of each single actor. To the
extent that the party apologizing and the victim are not the same, the
dissociation makes it much easier to apologize. First, because it is always
easier to admit that someone else was wrong, rather than oneself; 125 and
second, because the offender may be cast in a bad light without negative
implications for the image of the apologizing party.12 6
For example, when General Motors CEO Mary Barra took office, she
immediately had to start apologizing for the company's faulty ignition
switches-a horrible scandal that had claimed the lives of 124 individuals.127
Barra had no personal role in the incident, and, therefore, she was able to
profusely apologize without admitting any personal fault (or harming her
reputation); indeed, she apologized so effectively that she was heaped with
praise at her congressional hearing: "God bless you, and you're doing a good
job," replied Senator Barbara Boxer to Barra's apology.128 Even in a closer
case, such as BP's oil spill, CEO Tony Hayward did not bear full personal
a gesture through which an individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense
and the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule." ERVING
GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 113 (1971). On the relationship between apology and guilt, see
generally Bruce N. Waller, Sincere Apology Without Moral Responsibility, 33 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
441 (2007).
125. Apologies are sometimes coupled with some remedial action. Here again, commercial actors
have more options than individuals. As William Benoit noted, "[iut may be possible to limit damage by
firing one or more employees, but Hugh Grant cannot fire himself." WILLIAM L. BENOIT, ACCOUNTS,
EXCUSES, AND APOLOGIES: A THEORY OF IMAGE RESTORATION STRATEGIES 48 (2015).
126. An unexpected advantage commercial entities have is related to the standardization of
apologies. It may seem that spontaneous apologies are more powerful than scripted ones. If this were the
case, corporations might have been limited in their ability to control the provision of apologies. However,
research shows that strict guidelines actually result in more effective apologies. One study found that
apologies by a call center for reservation or billing mistakes had strong and significant effects on
consumer satisfaction. See Anna S. Mattila & Daniel J. Mount, The Role of Call Centers in Mollifying
Disgruntled Guests, 44 CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q., Aug. 2003, at 75, 77-80. In another
large qualitative study, researchers in the area of marketing found that corporations with stricter
guidelines and rules on apologies and complaint management produced greater consumer satisfaction and
increased their sense ofjustice. See Homburg & Fiirst, supra note 121, at 95.
127. See Danielle Ivory & Bill Vlasic, $900 Million Penalty for G.M 's Deadly Defect Leaves Many
Cold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/business/gm-to-pay-us-900-
million-over-ignition-switch-flaw.html.
128. Ben Geier, Why Do Some People Love GM's CEO Mary Barra?, FORTUNE (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/08/09/some-people-love-barra.
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responsibility for the explosion. The company claimed that it was mostly its
subcontractors who were to blame, and even though the court found the
company was itself grossly negligent, blame did not rest solely with the
CEO. 129
4. Corporate Culture
Scholars studying corporate culture and crisis management have
tracked a sea change in the degree of stigma attaching to commercial
apologies, with the stigma quickly declining in recent years.130 The reasons
are complex and many explanations are offered,' 3 ' including the creation of
a broader "new culture of apology," 32 the rise of the Internet, and the
introduction of relationship management strategies in the 1990s.133 Another
potential driver of these changes i the discovery in the marketing literature
of the "recovery paradox," whereby apologizing may actually improve
consumer relations relative to their level prior to the adverse incident.134
Whatever the true explanation is, experts see a strong shift in the way
apologies are treated today relative to the 1990s.135  Today, the
"[c]onventional wisdom" among scholars in business administration and
branding "holds that public apology in response to accusations of corporate
misconduct is one of the most important ways to restore a company's
reputation." 36 The default has reversed, and it is expected that companies
129. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, BP May Be Fined Up to $18 Billion for Spill in Gulf,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/bp-negligent-in-2010-oil-
spill-us-judge-rules.html.
130. See LAZARE, supra note 13, at 7.
131. For other explanations, see generally Zohar Kampf, The Age of Apology: Evidence from the
Israeli Public Discourse, 19 SOc. SEMIOTICS 257 (2009).
132. See Nicolaus Mills, The New Culture ofApology, 48 DISSENT 113, 114 (2001); Mihai, supra
note 20 ("A gesture formerly considered a sign of weakness has grown to represent moral strength and a
crucial step towards potential reconciliation."). See also Murphy, supra note 38, at 372 (noting, and
criticizing, the proliferation of apologies).
133. See Jan Breitsohl et al., Online Complaint Communication Strategy: An Integrated
Management Framework for e-Businesses, in HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC E-BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
907, 908 (Francisco J. Martinez-L6pez ed., 2014); Michael Volkov, Successful Relationship Marketing:
Understanding the Importance of Complaints in a Consumer-Oriented Paradigm, 2 PROBS. & PERSP.
MGMT. 113, 116-118 (2004).
134. See, e.g., James G. Maxham Ill & Richard G. Netemeyer, A Longitudinal Study ofComplaining
Customers' Evaluations ofMultiple Service Failures and Recovery Efforts, 66 J. MARKETING 57, 67-68
(2002) (showing in a longitudinal study the existence of a recovery paradox, but also noting that it
disappears if there are multiple adverse events).
135. See, e.g., Patel & Reinsch, supra note 118, at 14-15 (noting that hard data is difficult to find,
but the impression is that commercial apologies are frequently used).
136. John G. Knight et al., The Key Role ofSincerity in Restoring Trust in a Brand with a Corporate
Apology, in MARKETING DYNAMISM & SUSTAINABILITY: THINGS CHANGE, THINGS STAY THE SAME 192,
192 (Leroy Robinson, Jr. ed., 2015).
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will apologize; if in the past only the guilty apologized, now not apologizing
is a violation of consumers' expectations.137 Moreover, apologies are taken
to be a sign of strength and leadership.138 Even employees find that the
personal costs of apologizing are much lower than in the past; institutions,
like hospitals and insurance companies, often provide a support system,
assuring the injurer that apologizing is the right and honorable thing to do.
The increased popularity of apologies lowers their social cost, as the
reputational effect is diminished (and per the recovery paradox, actually
becomes positive).
C. EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMERCIAL APOLOGIES
Commercial actors, we just argued, enjoy important advantages with
respect to tendering apologies. It is, therefore, natural to doubt whether these
apologies have an effect on victims. Would not individuals reject apologies
in commercial settings, seeing them for what they are-strategic, profit-
maximizing decisions? Would not the making of repeated apologies by the
same institution adulterate their effect?
In practice, commercial apologies are highly effective. Researchers
studying commercial entities in online settings noted puzzlingly, after
finding strong effects, that "[i]t seems as if customers do not realize that they
are interacting with an employee who is paid to send apology emails and not
with an individual who experiences shame when apologizing."l39 The
researchers summarized their field test by bemusedly remarking that "[we]
find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the
firm than offering a monetary compensation."140
The best evidence of the effectiveness of commercial apologies can be
learned from their prevalence,141 but it would be illustrative to look at more
systemic evidence, which also gives a sense of the magnitude of the effect.
The clearest evidence comes from the healthcare industry, which is the most
studied area of commercial apologies, due to the large stakes involved and
the tragic frequency of accidents.142 Starting in the 1990s, hospitals became
137. See Sean Tucker et al., Apologies and Transformational Leadership, 63 J. Bus. ETHICS 195-
96 (2006).
138. Id. at 195 ("[E]thical leaders who attempt to 'do the right thing' with their words and actions
will be perceived as better leaders by followers.... [E]thical leaders apologize .... ).
139. See Johannes Abeler et al., The Power ofApology, 107 ECON. LETTERS 233, 235 (2010).
140. Id. at 233.
141. See, e.g., BENOIT, supra note 125, at 61 (noting the pervasiveness of corporate apologies).
142. See Data Analysis Tool, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES: NAT'L PRACTITIONER
DATA BANK, http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/analysistool (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) (reporting about 50,000
medical malpractice payments and adverse events in 2014).
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aware that many patients sue for emotional reasons, as they resent the lack
of apology for errors.143 This realization led to a series of successful
experiments with institutionalizing apologies.1'" An example is the pioneer
program of the University of Michigan Health System. The university
adopted a policy of disclosure and apology that required hospital personnel
and physicians to disclose mistakes and apologize for them. A detailed
before-and-after analysis of this program reveals significant effects. First,
the monthly rate of claims (defined as requests for monetary compensation)
fell by 36%.145 This means that about one-third of the victims gave up their
claims entirely. Second, the number of lawsuits fell by 65%.146 Third, the
cost per lawsuit fell from $405,921 to $228,308, a saving of $177,603 (44%).
Fourth, the costs of lawsuits fell not only due to savings on legal costs: the
hospital saved about 59% of the compensation it would have had to pay
patients.147
Another example is COPIC, the physician-founded insurance trust that
designed the "3Rs Program:" Recognition of the patient's harm, Response to
the issue in a timely manner, and Resolution-through apology and a small
offer of compensation. Looking at the data, the offers of compensation are
indeed small: in most cases, no payment is made at all, and in the rest, the
payment is for only $5,300.148 The program led to striking results-a
reduction of 50% in the number of malpractice claims against COPIC
physicians and a 23% reduction in the costs of payments in settlement.149 In
one of the case records, a sixty-six-year-old patient suffered from an error
that led to the removal of part of her ureter, treatment of which required a
painful invasive procedure. The program settled the entire case by paying
her $3,898 to account for her out-of-pocket expenses and, "generously," also
for her "gardening/lawn bills."15 0  These apology programs reduced
143. See Gallagher et al., supra note 24, at 1001.
144. See, e.g., Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 964-66 (1999) (finding financial savings in hospitals that
implemented a disclosure and compensation policy). See also ROBERT D. TRUOG ET AL., TALKING WITH
PATIENTS AND FAMILIES ABOUT MEDICAL ERROR 52-56 (2011).
145. See Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation ofa
Medical Error Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 215 (2010). See also Michelle
M. Mello et al., The Medical Liability Climate and Prospects for Reform, 312 JAMA 2146, 2149 (2014).
146. Kachalia et al., supra note 145, at 215.
147. Id.
148. See Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The
University ofMichigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE Scl. L. 125, 147-48 (2009). But see Seth Seabury
et al., Defense Costs ofMedical Malpractice Claims, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1354 (2012) (showing
average case costs of medical malpractice lawsuits of about $300,000).
149. See Boothman et al., supra note 148, at 147-48; Wojcieszak et al., supra note 54, at 346.
150. See Richert E. Quinn & Mary C. Eichler, The 3Rs Program: The Colorado Experience, 51
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significantly the number of compensation requests, the number of lawsuits,
and most importantly for our purposes, the amounts paid to patients.
Looking more broadly, economists Benjamin Ho and Elaine Liu find
that commercial apologies are highly effective. They investigated how
apology safe-harbor laws affect malpractice lawsuits, assuming that changes
in outcomes in the apology-immunizing states are attributable to these laws.
Based on this methodology, they find that a state that adopts an apology law
sees a reduction of about 17% in payments for severe medical injuries, '51
equivalent to a per-payment reduction of $58,000-73,000.152 This is
remarkable, as the averages come from all hospitals-not necessarily those
which instituted an apology policy-suggesting that the real effect is
probably much larger. Consistent with that, a recent working paper found
that apology laws lead to a reduction of $65,000 in payments to victims
across all injury levels.153
Apologies in a commercial setting are effective beyond the medical
context. In a vignette study, researchers found that consumers express
greater willingness to purchase from companies which apologize in ways
perceived as sincere.154 In the commercial context of housing, Russell
Korobkin and Chris Guthrie found that participants playing the role of
tenants were more likely to accept a settlement offer compensating for a
landlord's infraction of duties if they were told that the landlord
apologized.155 These results seem to carry over to the market: in market
settings, electronically-delivered apologies led disappointed consumers to
retract unfavorable reviews at a rate much greater than when they were
offered monetary settlements.156 Moreover, firms are said to perform better
CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 709, 715 (2008).
151. See Ho & Liu, Does Sorry Work?, supra note 9, at 143.
152. Id.
153. See McMichael et al., supra note 9, at 5.
154. See Denghua Yuan et al., Sorry Seems to Be the Hardest Word: The Effect of Self-Attribution
When Apologizing for a Brand Crisis, (H.K. Inst. of Bus. Studies Working Paper Series, No. 073-1314,
2014).
155. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 25, at 148 (reporting a 12% increase; although this effect
failed to reach statistical significance, the size and sign of the effect are nevertheless consistent with our
argument.).
156. On eBay, customers can leave negative responses, which can later be withdrawn if a seller's
feedback satisfies the consumer. A group of researchers collaborated with a very large seller to randomly
modify the seller's response to negative reviews left by customers on transactions with an average value
of E23.50, offering (1) small monetary compensation (E2.50); (2) large monetary compensation (E5); or
(3) an electronically-delivered apology from one of the seller's employees, without admitting any legal
liability and without offering monetary compensation. They found that small monetary compensation
yielded forgiveness (i.e., retraction of the negative review) in 19.3% of the cases, and doubling the amount
of compensation only slightly increased the forgiveness rate to 22.9%. The tender of an apology
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in the stock market after taking responsibility for past failures.15 7
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The normative framework we provided in Part II.A.2 demonstrates that
apologies can have detrimental social implications unless certain conditions
are met. We have also shown that commercial apologies are both cheap to
tender and highly effective. In light of this, we move to critically analyze the
movement that transformed the law and to outline necessary policy changes
in response to this reform.
A. BETTER SORRY THAN SAFE
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that apologies are socially
undesirable if they are relatively cheap to tender and if they have strong
effects on the amounts victims seek. When these conditions obtain, the
problem is that sophisticated commercial actors would be able to
anticipate-before they engage in dangerous activities-that an apology
would reduce their exposure to liability for any ensuing accidents. Because
of that, they would have less incentive to be careful, which may increase the
level of accidents. Conversely, they would find it preferable to be sorry rather
than safe. Indeed, if apologies are costly to tender or only mildly effective,
this concern does not arise. However, we believe our analysis above strongly
suggests the possibility of a problem, as commercial apologies are likely to
be more effective and cheaper to deliver in commercial settings. To illustrate,
in one case, a patient was willing to settle after the apology simply because
outperformed both measures, generating a forgiveness rate of 44.8%. See Abeler, supra note 139, at 234.
157. Consider, for example, the 2009 crisis at Domino's Pizza, when a disgruntled employee
publicized a video of himself committing what we can euphemistically call "health code violations" on
customers' pizzas. Soon after, Twitter was flooded with tweets deriding the company and its products.
Patrick Doyle, the company's president, uploaded a response video to YouTube, in which he apologized,
said that he was sickened by the act, and reported corrective action. See Swifttalon, Domino 's President
Responds to Prank Video, YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-dem6eA7-
A21. An empirical analysis of 20,773 tweets discovered that this action was highly effective, and that the
corporate brand, as reflected by tweets, was restored to its original level. See Hoh Kim et al., The Effect
of Bad News and CEO Apology of Corporate on User Responses in Social Media, 10 PLOS ONE
e0126358 1, 13 (2015). Others in the field reflected similar appreciation of the effectiveness of this
apology, and although far from being necessarily causally related, the brand is thriving. Domino's stock
now trades for more than twenty times its 2009 price, adjusted for dividends and splits. See Domino's
Pizza, Inc., YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/DPZ/history?periodl=1236927600&
period2=1504767600&interval=lmo&filter-history&frequency-1lmo (last visited Sept. 7, 2017). On the
relationship between firms' performance and corporate honesty, see generally Don Chance et al., Poor
Performance and the Value of Corporate Honesty, 33 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (2015). Indeed, the return on
investment in apology mechanisms was estimated by researchers as being greater than 100% in some
cases. See Homburg & Filrst, supra note 121, at 95.
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she felt the hospital took her case seriously.'58 The hospital, on the other
hand, saved an approximate $3 million in liability payments in a lawsuit that,
according to the hospital's estimation, the patient was highly likely to win. 159
Of course, the apology itself had some cost, but nothing in the evidence
indicates this cost was large; indeed, this case is touted for its cost-saving
effect. 160
A clear prediction that follows from our analysis is that apology laws
will increase the frequency or severity of accidents in states that adopt them
relative to non-apology law states. This is in contrast to the hypothesis of the
Legal Apologists, which stipulates that apology laws will reduce levels of
litigation without a concomitant increase in the level of accidents. If our
hypothesis is correct, its implications are disconcerting. We would expect
apology law states to see a reduction in precautionary investments, with food
companies spending less on quality assurance, hospitals ordering fewer tests
and hiring less staff, and polluters investing less in smoke scrubs. To assess
the validity of each hypothesis, we need empirical data; unfortunately, the
empirical data we have from the two studies on the topic is inconclusive,
although it is largely consistent with our prediction.
The most rigorous analysis to date was conducted by Ho and Liu, who
looked at the effect of apology laws on the level of disposed medical
malpractice claims.16 1 They found that apology laws increase the number of
disposed claims involving severe injuries by 21-27%.162 This would seem to
comport with our hypothesis of an increase in accidents and their severity,
but the problem is that the data consists only of disposed cases, and the
definition of disposed cases makes it hard to draw any conclusions.163 In fact,
Ho and Liu argue that the rise is mostly attributable to the greater speed of
processing claims, and that over time there are fewer claims.164 But this
conclusion is constrained by the meaning and interpretation of disposed
claims, a problematic category that only includes complaints with positive
money payments. Thus, it does not include all, or even most, of the accidents
158. Boothman et al., supra note 148, at 157.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Ho & Liu, Does Sorry Work?, supra note 9, at 141.
162. See id. at 158 tbl.5.
163. See id. at 143 ("Given that the . .. data set only consists of claims with positive payouts, it does
not contain information on open claims nor closed claims without payments.").
164. They indeed find that over time, apology law states see a significant reduction in disposed
claims for non-severe injuries, but they also find an increase in the level of severe injuries, which they
interpret as resulting from a staggered effect of the apology laws. However, these findings are also
consistent with the theory that apology laws increase the severity of accidents. Id at 162.
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or cases where no payment was made.165 Another limitation is that it is
possible to make payments without reporting them, and some hospitals seem
to be doing so.16 6
Another problem is the tension between Ho and Liu's findings and
those of Benjamin McMichael's more recent working paper.167 In the latter
study, researchers obtained ata from an insurer that accounts not only for
disposed claims with positive payments, but for all claims that were filed
with the insurer. This does not account for accidents that do not result in a
formal claim, but it does provide a broader approach to the issue.168 The
authors of the study find that apology laws reduce payments to patients by
82%, which is equivalent to a reduction of $65,000 in the average
payment. 169 They explain this result as driven mostly by the increase of
claims that do not result in payment. In other words, they find that apologies
mainly increase the volume of claims where no payment is made, but do not
affect the level of payments in other cases. They also find, however, that
claims are more likely to turn into a lawsuit under apology laws-which is
clearly inconsistent with the goals of apology laws. Both of these studies
provide much needed insight, but they do not clearly illuminate the key
variable of interest: the level of accidents. The lack of more focused research
is potentially attributable to the misunderstanding of the potential negative
effect of apologies on incentives, and we hope that this Article will spur
future research in this area.
B. THE PARADOX OF EXCESSIVE APOLOGIES
At the heart of the apology law reform is the argument that injurers are
wary of apologizing due to the legal ramifications of exposing themselves to
liability.170 To overcome this fear, the argument goes, apologies should be
privileged, shielding injurers from the evidentiary implications of potential
admission of fault. The Legal Apologists argue that privileging apologies
165. This is especially a problem, since most cases are disposed without payment. See McMichael
et al., supra note 9, at 16 ("Analysis of our data indicates that excluding claims that involved no payment
to a claimant results in excluding over half of all malpractice claims.").
166. See Teninbaum, supra note 39, at 316-17 (discussing rules in an apology program that are
designed to circumvent reporting requirements). See also Amitabh Chandra et al., The Growth of
Physician Medical Malpractice Payments: Evidence from the National Practitioner Data Bank, W5
HEALTH AFF. 240, 242 (2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/05/31/
hlthaff.w5.240.full.pdf (estimating underreporting in data of about 20 percent of malpractice payments).
167. See McMichael et al., supra note 9, at 5.
168. See id. at 10. On the other hand, their data is limited to only one specialty area, which may
introduce other kind of unanticipated biases.
169. Id. at 27.
170. See Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 50; Robbennolt, Legal Settlement, supra note 25, at 465.
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would encourage injurers to apologize, thus leading to important benefits-
most importantly, the control of litigation costs.171
This statement involves a potential paradox with no easy resolution.
The first argument-that injurers do not apologize for fear of legal liability-
assumes that apologies encourage litigation (unless they are privileged). But
at the same time, the main reason that Legal Apologists favor apologies is
that they encourage settlement and therefore discourage litigation. It is
seemingly paradoxical to argue that apologies both encourage and
discourage litigation at the same time. Resolving this paradox comes at a
price. Perhaps, for example, unprivileged apologies have a disparate effect;
they reduce the incentive to bring suit but increase the probability that the
victim will prevail in a lawsuit by having better evidence. While coherent,
this resolution also raises problems. It is unclear why the evidentiary
advantage of apologies does not entice more victims to file lawsuits. More
importantly, if privileging apologies will not reduce the level of litigation,
but will only reduce the likelihood that the victim will prevail, then apologies
lose much of their luster.
Another possibility is to argue that apologies have a heterogeneous
impact on victims. Some victims will sue unless they receive an apology, so
apologies would reduce litigation in their case and are thus desirable. Other
victims would only sue if they receive an apology (as the apology will
provide them with sufficient evidence) and for this class of victims,
privileging apologies will reduce litigation costs. While coherent, this
resolution is also problematic, as it omits the class of victims who would sue
even when they receive an apology. Privileging apologies will reduce the
likelihood that this class of victims will prevail in litigation, and thus
involves a cost.172 Whether this cost exceeds the benefit of controlling
litigation from the other group is an empirical question, which admits the
possibility that apologies will be undesirable.
C. APOLOGY AS DISCLOSURE
A recurrent narrative, especially among medical professionals, is that
apologies help because they facilitate the communication of mistakes. As put
by Clinton and Obama:
171. See supra note 21.
172. To be clear, injurers would save a corresponding amount, as they would be more likely to
prevail in litigation. However, if we make the (natural) assumption that the likelihood of prevailing at
trial corresponds to the culpability of the injurer, then privileging apologies would benefit mostly culpable
injurers, thus undermining deterrence.
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Under our proposal, physicians would be given certain protections from
liability within the context of the program, in order to promote a safe
environment for disclosure. By promoting better communication, this
legislation would provide doctors and patients with an opportunity to find
solutions outside the courtroom.17 3
On this account, privileging apologies would mean that injurers would be
more willing to admit their mistakes. The reason why admitting mistakes is
important is presumably an instrumental one; by recognizing mistakes, the
parties can learn and do better in the future.174
This logic may be applicable in many interpersonal settings, but it
transfers poorly to a commercial environment. Before touching on this point,
it should be noted that the basic assumption here-that mistakes are not
divulged due to liability-is doubted by many who believe the main causes
for hiding mistakes are factors such as culture and social norms.171 Indeed,
studies comparing the rate of disclosure of errors in the United States and
countries with lower levels of liability for medical malpractice find no
difference in error reporting in hospitals.176 The problem is the assumption
that mistakes, once identified, will be corrected. In many commercial
settings, learning from one's mistakes is not simple. Taking precautions
often involves investment in machinery, staff, and technology. These costs
can be very high-consider the cost of purchasing an MRI machine, or even
of standard bloodwork procedures if done on a large scale-and it will
certainly be contradictory to our approach in most other areas of law to
believe that actors will have sufficient incentive to internalize the costs of
their actions without the threat of any legal action. 177 This inconsistency was
noted by David Hyman and Richard Silver:
It is naive to think that error reporting and health care quality would
improve automatically by removing the threat of liability.... No statistical
study shows an inverse correlation between malpractice exposure and the
173. See Clinton & Obama, supra note 81, at 2207.
174. Id. at 2205.
175. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 97 (2005) (arguing that "you first have to
prove that mistakes would be out in the open if there were no medical malpractice lawsuits. That is clearly
not the case.").
176. See George J. Annas, The Patient's Right to Safety-Improving the Quality of Care Through
Litigation Against Hospitals, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2065-66 (2006) (comparing with New
Zealand); Amy Widman, Liability and the Health Care Bill: An "Alternative" Perspective, I CALIF. L.
REV. CIR. 57, 59 (2010).
177. Clinton and Obama proposed that savings from apology programs will be used to reduce the
premiums doctors pay-but this would be the equivalent of transferring money from victims of accidents
to physicians. Clinton & Obama, supra note 81, at 2206. They also proposed that some of the savings
will be used to "foster patient-safety initiatives." Id. at 2207.
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frequency of error reporting, or indicates that malpractice liability
discourages providers from reporting mistakes.1
D. THE DEFICIT OF APOLOGY DEFICIT
Motivating the entire movement of the Legal Apologists is belief in an
apology deficit. The concern is that injurers have too little incentive to
apologize, and they therefore need encouragement. It may seem odd in
retrospect, but besides anecdotal evidence, the point that there is a deficit in
apologies has never been proven. Do we really have a shortfall of apologies?
Are commercial actors shying away from apologizing?
The core problem is that even without any reform, commercial injurers
should have a strong incentive to apologize. As we have noted, apologies
create value to injurers by suppressing victims' litigiousness. If apologies are
value-creating, then just like any other good, profit-maximizing companies
would seek to "produce" them. Given the many benefits Legal Apologists
ascribe to apologies, it would be odd if companies would not provide them.
Indeed, the literature is in agreement hat there is a marked transition among
companies from the age of "deny and defend" to one of "apologize and
settle."1 79 Today, commentators agree that commercial apologies have
become commonplace.s0 As early as 2002, well before most states adopted
apology laws, a survey of hospital risk managers revealed that 68% would
respond to a mistake with an apology, which suggests a broad appreciation
of the commercial benefits of apologies.
Psychiatrist Aaron Lazare conducted a casual empirical analysis to
develop a basic intuition of the prevalence of commercial apologies by
looking at the discourse on apologies in the media.1 82 To expand his analysis,
we reanalyzed the data using a larger database. Consistent with his findings,
Figure 1 illustrates our findings on the basis of a broad range of media reports
acquired from the EBSCO Information Services database, which includes
twenty-five million media articles from the relevant time period.183 As can
178. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is
Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 898-99,
914 (2005).
179. See, e.g., Wojcieszak, supra note 54, at 344-45, 347.
180. Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY
OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE, 8-11 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
18 1. See Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22
HEALTH AFF. 73, 77 (2003).
182. LAZARE, supra note 13, at 6-7.
183. Our methodology consisted of EBSCO search results for "apology" or "sorry" or related words
in the title or subject terms, restricted to magazines, newspapers, reviews, and trade publications in the
English language between 1971 and 2015. A total of 4,967 results were located, which, after removing
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be seen, until the 1990s, apologies were hardly considered in the media. But
thereafter, there has been a growing interest hat persists through today.
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NOTE: Data source and methodology are discussed supra in note 183 and accompanying text.
Overall, the consensus in the literature on the "age of apologies" is well
reflected in this analysis. While this does not amount to a rigorous analysis
of the topic, it does suggest that the apology deficit may not exist.
E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Ongoing tort reform through apology laws is politically and legally
problematic. There are currently calls to further expand the ambit of apology
laws,184 and to encourage mediators and arbitrators, judges, and juries to
account for them.185 If past successes and momentum are any indication,
these calls are likely to be translated into legislation in the near future. Our
analysis suggests that the case presented by reformists is lacking in
theoretical and empirical support. There is a question whether there is an
duplicates, we narrowed to 3,747. Gated permalink to results: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct-true&db-aph&bquery-(TI+apology)+OR+(SU+apology)+OR+(TI+sorry)+OR+(SU+sorry)&cli
0-LA99&clv0=Eng&type=1&site=ehost-live&scope=site. To account for potential bias due to the fact
that more media is produced today than in the past, we validated our findings by limiting our search to
the New York Times, New York Times Magazine, Economist, and New Yorker--all of which existed prior
to 1971.
184. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1061; Gailey, supra note 3, at 176-78; Jones, supra note 13, at
580-8 1; Runnels, supra note 3, at 148.
185. See, e.g., Robyn Carroll, Apologies as a Legal Remedy, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 317, 320 (2013).
2017] 1239
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
apology deficit, and there is a real concern that apologies will be used to
circumvent legal liability for accidents by strategic actors. Politically, we are
concerned that apology laws have been used as a covert tort reform, avoiding
public scrutiny. These issues raise a few policy implications.
The first order of business is transparency. Apology laws should be
understood-and debated-in terms of tort reform. The public, advocates,
and legislators should be made aware of the social effects of apology laws.
This does not mean that apology laws should never be enacted-the debate
on tort reform is an active one that is far from being settled. However, the
debate should be conducted transparently, not guised in the discourse of
virtue or penance, but in the more real terms of reducing compensation to
victims which may or may not be excessive.186
Second, a moratorium should be placed on all future expansions of
apology safe-harbor laws. Besides the political concern, there are significant
social concerns regarding these laws. Apology laws make the tender of
apologies "cheaper" from the viewpoint of the injurer, and the analysis
demonstrates that reducing the costs of apologies can lead to socially harmful
outcomes, in the form of risky behavior. The evidence we gathered suggests
that this risk is real, given the effectiveness of commercial apologies and
their low cost.
Third, there is a push to encourage judges and juries to show leniency
in their judgments towards remorseful injurers.187 In a sense, these initiatives
are even more troublesome than the safe-harbor laws, as safe-harbor laws
protect apologies that can prevent litigation, but this policy encourages
apologies that do not even have this effect. Indeed, some have argued that
there is a case for treating apologizing defendants more severely.18 8 We
186. Supporters of tort reform would also benefit from better recognition of the effect of apologies.
There are many tools in the tort reformers' toolkit, such as damages caps, procedural adjustments, and
panel screening of cases. Each of these tools has its own advantages and shortcomings. Compared with
damages caps, for example, apology laws have the disadvantage of being impossible to calibrate. If one
thinks that the true harm from a medical accident is $250,000, then a damages cap at this level could rein
in courts. But the effect of apologies on victims is highly idiosyncratic, and it does not allow for easy
corrections. On the other hand, apology laws encourage informal settlements, and this may have merit of
its own. Either way, a candid evaluation of alternatives would be prudent.
187. See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 128-29 (advocating lenient treatment of
remorseful offenders). Interestingly, a new study provides preliminary evidence suggesting that apologies
have little effect on judges. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies
Affect Adjudication?, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1189, 1194 (2013) (finding in a vignette study that "a
defendant's apology in court is generally ineffective, sometimes counterproductive, and only occasionally
beneficial.").
188. Mungan argues that treating apologies more harshly helps differentiate between sincere
apologies-which are meant to relieve guilt-and non-sincere apologies. See Mungan, supra note 4, at
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recognize that it may seem counterintuitive to treat remorseful and
unremorseful injurers equally,189 but it is important to remember that our
discussion is limited only to commercial actors, for whom the expression of
remorse is at least suspect. In sum, there should be a presumption against the
preferential treatment of commercial actors who apologize during trial.
Finally, the questions we raised here touch on important social policies,
but the data we currently have is limited. It will be necessary for
policymakers to devote funds and grants for studies in this area, and perhaps
there is room to use funding from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act's special allotment to this end.190
CONCLUSION
Over the last three decades, apology law reform has swept the nation.
Tort reformers and commercial interests provided funding to a strong lobby
that co-opted the rhetoric and discourse developed by a movement of legal
scholars we called the Legal Apologists. The work of the Legal Apologists
has contributed greatly to our philosophical, social, and psychological
understanding of the role of apologies in both the law and in our daily lives.
However, they have failed to articulate an account of apologies in
commercial settings and have not considered the potentially socially harmful
effects of apologies of this type. This oversight has not been lost on tort
reformers, who advocated for apology law reforms to effectively achieve tort
reform through the back door.
We argue that making apologies cheaper may lead to socially harmful
outcomes. To support our claims, we develop a new model for tort liability
with apologies, which we use to show that injurers may have an excessive
incentive to apologize if apologies are cheap and effective. Based on the
evidence we have gathered, we find that commercial actors professionalize
and institutionalize the tender of apologies and use them to great effect. This
suggests that apologies may actively undermine deterrence and lead to risky
behavior. Based on this analysis, we call for a moratorium on apology laws
and a political and legal revaluation of the ones that currently exist. Through
a transparent and honest assessment of apology laws, based on an
understanding of these laws as means of tort reform, we can reach informed
and democratic decisions on their desirability.
179.
189. For the moral argument that it is wrong for the law to treat repentant and unrepentant
transgressors equally, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
190. Under the Act, grants are awarded to states for "the development, implementation, and
evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes." 42 U.S.C. § 280g-l 5(a) (2012).
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This Article should spark a much needed discussion on apologies,
commercial interests, tort reform, and liability for harms. From an ethical
perspective, there is still much to be said about he value of apologies made
by incorporeal entities such as corporations. We are especially hoping that
future empirical research will devote more specific attention to the
relationship between apology laws and the possible increase of medical
malpractice.
TORT REFORM THROUGH THE BACK DOOR
APPENDIX:
A MODEL OF LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENTS WITH APOLOGIES
The Legal Apologists argue that apologies curb litigation. However,
they have failed to consider the full implications on ex-ante behavior. In this
section, we provide a model designed to articulate the implications of this
distinction in terms of the social desirability of apologies, with a focus on
the problem of deterrence.
To fit apologies within the framework of the incentive to take care, we
take the conventional model of accidents.191 In the model, a potential injurer
chooses a level of precautions for an activity. These precautions are costly,
but they reduce the risk of an accident. If an accident occurs, then the injurer
faces liability for the harm caused by the accident. Alternatively, the injurer
may choose to apologize, which is privately costly (e.g., loss of face,
humiliation, reputation, the time involved, or other psychological
considerations). Making an apology affects the level of liability because the
victim may be more willing to settle or less interested in litigation, the jury
may be more forgiving, or the judge may be less likely to attribute fault.
Additionally, there are some administrative costs involved in litigation, such
as the costs of operating the court.192 Because apologies reveal information,
induce settlements, and reduce the necessary expenses of trials, making one
reduces the administrative cost. With this in mind, we introduce the
following notation:
c: cost of precautions (c > 0);
h: harm;
q(c): probability of harm (q(O) = 1, q'<O, q "<O); 193
T: the injurer's choice regarding apology: T = 1 if apology is tendered,
T = 0 otherwise;
a: the cost of making an apology;
s(T): social cost of enforcement (s() > 0);
1(T): injurer's liability.
Based on our assumptions, we note that 1(0) = h and s(1) < s(). That
is, the liability for the accident, absent an apology, is equal to the harm, and
191. See Steven Shavell,Liability for Accidents, in HANDBOOK OF LAW& ECONOMICS, 139, 143-
44 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
192. See id at l50.
193. We make the conventional assumption that precautions reduce the probability of harm, but that
there are diminishing marginal returns to investing in precautions.
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the social cost of administering punishments is lower when an apology is
made. Looking ex-post (after the harm has occurred), we make the following
argument:
Proposition 1: The private incentive to apologize diverges from the
social interest in apologies. [i] Injurers will have an incentive to apologize
even when it is not socially desirable, and [ii] may fail to apologize even
when an apology is desirable.
Proof:
Consider first the private cost of the activity for the injurer, denoted as
= -c - q(c)(Ta + 1(T))
That is, the injurer bears the cost of precautions. If an accident occurs, the
injurer further bears the cost of apology if one is made, as well as the costs
of liability, which also depend on whether an apology was made. The injurer
will choose to apologize (T = 1) if the cost of the activity when making an
apology (0j) is lower than the cost of the activity without one (0o):
0~1 < 00 =
(1) a < 1(0) - 1(1)
We see that an apology is only privately desirable if it reduces liability by
more than its cost. The social cost of the activity is different. It consists of
the harm to the victim, the cost of enforcement, and also the costs of the
apology, if made:
(2) 0 = -c - q(c)(Ta + h + s(T))
Therefore, apology is socially desirable only if the cost from making one (01)
is lower than the social costs in its absence (0o):
ot < 00 =
(3) a< s() - s(1)
This means (from 2 and 4) that the injurer will have an excessive incentive
to apologize whenever:
(4) s() - s(1) < a < 1(0) - 1(1)
That is, if the cost of apology exceeds its social benefits, but liability is
reduced by a greater amount, the injurer will have an incentive to apologize
when it is socially undesirable. Symmetrically, the injurer will not apologize,
even though an apology is socially desirable, if:
(5) 1(0) - 1(1) < a < s(O) - s(1)
QED.
Proposition 2: If apologies are privately beneficial for the injurer: [i]
the injurer will choose a level of precautions that is lower than the socially
optimal level, [ii] the harms from the activity will be higher than the socially
optimum, and [iii] the more the treatment of apologies is favored by the legal
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system, the less care and more harm injurers will create.
Proof:
The injurer chooses the level of precautions based on the expected costs
of the activity, given by (1). When the injurer expects apology to be a




Let c* be the solution to (7). Note that the socially desirable level of
precautions (from 3) is:
(7) q(c)
a+h+s(1)
Comparing the two, we can see that a + 1(1) < a + h + s(1). To see that,
recall that an apology is only made if (2) holds, i.e., a < 1(0) - 1(1), from
which follows directly that 1(1) < 1(0). Therefore, and because 1(0) = h, it can
be shown that 1(1) < h. It then follows that the inequality necessarily holds.
Note that this is true even if the injurer would bear the social cost of
enforcement s(l). Even if that was the case, still a + 1(1) + s(1) < a + h +
s(1), as long as apologies help injurers reduce liability (1(1) < 1(0) = h).
Given the concavity of q, it follows that the solution to (8) is greater than c*.
To verify [iii], note that the greater the difference between 1(0) and 1(1)
becomes (i.e., the more that favorable treatment to apologizers is given by
the legal system), the more the gap between optimal and actual precautions
increases.
QED.
Finally, we consider the possibility that some injurers do not apologize,
and the possibility that it would be worthwhile to lower liability to encourage
them to apologize.
Proposition 3: Providing preferential treatment to apologies is only
socially desirable if: [i] the costs of apologies currently not rendered are
lower than the benefit of reducing administrative costs, and [ii] the decrease
in the administrative costs is not outweighed by an increase in the harms
from the injurer's activity.
Proof:
A socially desirable apology will not be made only if (6) holds, so part
[i] follows directly. To verify [ii], note that if (6) holds true, the injurer will
not apologize and will take precautions accordingly. The cost of the activity
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for the injurer, from (1), would be:
(8) 5 = -c - q(c)(1(0))
So that the level of precautions is determined by:
(9) q'(c) = 1(0)
Let c** be the solution to (9). This means that the social cost of the activity
if apology is not given would be:
(10) 0o = -c** - q(c**)(h + s(0))
Conversely, if apology is given, the social cost of the activity is:
(11) 01 = -c* - q(c*)(a + h + s(1))
Lowering 1(1) to make apology privately beneficial is socially desirable only
if 00<01.
(12) -c** - q(c**)(h + s(0)) < -c* -
q(c*)(a + h + s(1))
Or after rearranging, if:
(13) q(c*)(a + s(1)) - q(c**)s(O) < c** -
c* + q(c**)h - q(c*)h
That is, apology has the benefit of reducing the administrative cost in the
event of an accident. It also has a cost due to the increase in net harm from
the activity because of the diluted deterrence. The apology is only desirable
if its benefits exceed these costs.
QED.
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